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THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Basic Data
(As of September 30, 1979, unless otherwise stated)
1. Year of Establishment: 1962
Paid-in share capital /a
2. Ownership: Won million Percent
Government of Korea 3,279.4 65.6
Commercial banks 1,706.3 34.1
Others 14.3 0.3
Total 5,000.0 100.0
3. Operations (Won million): Jan.-Sept.
1976 1977 1978 1979
Approvals /b
Working capital loans 108,996 169,163 152,463 136,539
Equipment loans 11,822 17,332 17,093 15,442
Total Business Loans 120,818 186,495 169,556 151,981
General populace loans /c - 87,984 108,488 170,984 152,308
Total Approvals 208,802 294,983 340,540 304,289
Outstanding
Working capital loans 143,548 174,634 205,429 257,745
Equipment loans 21,642 28,738 32,285 36,040
Total Business Loans 165.190 203,372 237,714 293,785
General populace loans /c 87,884 130,468 196,261 229,204
Total Outstanding 253,074 333,840 433,975 522,989
4. Earnings Record (percentages):
Net income as % of average equity 11.4 11.5 20.6
Financial expenses as % of average
total assets 7.6 8.9 8.6
Administrative expenses as % of
average total assets 3.8 3.6 3.7
Book value as % of par 183 187 222
Dividend payout ratio 35 37 19
/a Paid-in share capital is being increased by W 25 billion (W 11.2 billion
in cash and W 13.8 billion in assets revaluation) with equal participation
by the Government and commercial banks.
/b Given the nature of domestic currency operations, approvals are simultaneous
with commitments and disbursements.
/c Including households and individuals.
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5. Financial Position (Won million): Sept. 30
1976 1977 1978 1979
Total assets 371,573 591,024 868,792 1,113,396
Of which total loan portfolio 253,074 333,840 433,975 522,989
Of which term loan portfolio 244,824 323,325 406,269 443,571
Long-term debt 160,661 245,641 345,817 393,663
Equity 8,234 9,370 11,076 26,911
Current ratio 1.07 1.05 1.19 1.09
Total debt/equity ratio 44.1 62.1 77.4 40.4
Long-term debt/equity ratio /a 14.5 21.7 24.2 9.3
Reserves and provisions as % of
loan portfolio 1.87 1.61 1.60 4.52
6. CNB's Interest Rates and Charxes (effective from
January 12, 1980): /b
% p.a.
Foreign Currency Loans
ADB first loan 9.5
Korea foreign exchange fund LIBOR + 1.5%
Domestic Currency Loans
Equipment Loans
Mutual installment savings 21.16 - 24.08
Bills 24.5 - 25.0
Working Capital Loans
Remuneration basis 21.16 - 24.08
Bills, discount on bills, } 24.5 -25.0
installment savings
Overdrafts 26.5 - 27.0
General Populace Loans
Remuneration basis 21.16 - 24.08
With savings as collateral 25.0
Bills, installment savings 25.0
Penalty charges on overdue loans 40.0
/a After excluding current maturities.
/b In line with the practice of Korean government-owned financial institutions
in relending foreign exchange resources borrowed from official sources
(IBRD, ADB, et al), CNB charges a uniform spread of two percentage points
above its borrowing rate.
AEP Projects Department
February 29, 1980

1. THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Contribution to the Economy
1.01 Since the early 1960s, the industrial sector, and more specifi-
cally manufacturing,/l has been the engine of growth of the Korean economy.
Over the period 1974-78, the manufacturing sector has grown at an average
17% p.a. in real terms compared to an average 10.3% growth of aggregate GNP.
As a consequence of this faster growth rate, the share of manufacturing in
total GNP has increased from about 20% in 1971 to nearly 32% in 1978. By
end 1978, manufacturing employment reached just over 3 million and accounted
for 22.4% of the total employed population compared to 15.9% in 1973. Over
the five year period 1974-78, approximately 1.2 million jobs have been
created in the manufacturing sector; this represented 58% of total
employment creation during that period.
1.02 Export Orientation and Export Dependence. Korea's success story
in economic development is largely based on a strategy of export promotion
with particular emphasis on manufactured exports. Total commodity exports
just exceeded US$10 billion in current prices in 1977 and reached
US$12.7 billion in 1978. Manufactured goods, which accounted for about
52% of total exports in 1964, have gradually increased their share and have
remained at about 90% for the past three years. It is estimated that
export expansion contributed about 35% of manufacturing output growth over
the period 19 75-77 against 74% for domestic demand./2 Gradual changes
have taken place in the structure of manufactured exports over the past
three years: light manufactured products including textiles have declined
in relative terms from 56% to 53%; machinery, transport equipment and
chemicals have increased their share from 18% in 1974 to 22% in 1977; some of
Korea's traditional light exports such as footwear and clothing have remained
buoyant, edging up from 26.7% to 28.4%.
1.03 The growth rate of commodity exports slowed down in real terms
to about 15.8% p.a. over the period 1977-78 compared to an average of 32.7%
over the period 1972-76. The 15.8% p.a. growth rate of real exports was in
fact lower than 17% average annual growth in manufacturing, which seems to
indicate the growing importance of the domestic market for the manufacturing
sector. This may prove a favorable development considering that until 1977
the export dependence of the manufacturing sector had been rising faster than
expected. The ratio of manufactured exports to output reached 28.3% in 1977
/1 In 1978, manufacturing alone accounted for 96% of total value added
(in 1975 prices) in the industrial sector (i.e. mining and
manufacturing).
/2 Import substitution made a negative (-9%) contribution.
with considerable variations in the dependence ratio between the various
subsectors./1 The ratio of commodity exports to GNP had likewise increased
from 26.7% in 1975 to 34.4% in 1978.
Structural Changes in Manufacturing
1.04 The growth of the manufacturing sector has been accompanied
by significant adjustments in the structure of production by the various
component subsectors as shown in the following table:
Table 1: COMPOSITION OF VALUE ADDED IN MANUFACTURING, 1970-78
(W billion in 1975 prices)
1970 1974 1978
Amount % Amount % Amount %
Light Industries
Textile 176.9 15.6 425.0 18.5 710.1 16.3
Others 484.0 42.6 798.9 34.7 1,336.3 30.7
Subtotal 660.9 58.2 1,223.9 53.2 2,046.4 47.0
Heavy Industries
Basic metals 26.9 2.4 102.1 4.4 224.9 5.2
Machinery /a 111.1 9.8 361.0 15.7 971.2 22.3
Chemicals /b 336.7 29.6 614.1 26.7 1,107.4 22.5
Subtotal 474.7 41.8 1,077.2 46.8 2,303.5 53.0
Total Manufacturing 1,135.6 100.0 2.301.1 100.0 4,349.9 100.0
/a Including fabricated metal products.
/b Including paper and paper products, petroleum and nonmetallic
mineral products.
Source: Table 8.13. World Bank Economic Report dated May 15, 1979.
1.05 The composition of manufacturing shows a marked shift in favor of
the heavy and chemical sectors which exceeded 50% of total manufacturing
value added for the first time in 1978. The most significant gains have
/1 The export output ratio reached a level of 67% for wood and furniture
and 91% for miscellaneous products in 1977.
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been registered by the machinery sector. The rate of growth of chemical
industries, however, lagged behind the aggregate manufacturing sector and
their share consequently declined from about 30% in 1970 to 22.5% in 1978.
Light industries have declined steadily since 1970. The sharpest declines
were recorded in the food, beverage and tobacco sector. Textiles have been
maintaining their 1.6-17% share of total manufacturing value added. In fact,
textile yarn and fabric industries have lost ground but this was compensated
by the good performance of footwear and clothing. The changes in the
structure of manufacturing reflect a deliberate policy gradually to shift
production from Korea's traditional light industrial production towards more
skill- and technology-intensive types of production.
Geographic Distribution
1.06 The 1975 population census showed that approximately 27% of the
population of Korea lived in the cities of Seoul and Busan; the province
of North Gyeongsang in which Taegu, the third largest industrial city
is located accounted for another 14%. The following table shows that the
regional distribution of manufacturing enterprises and employment is
even more skewed in favor of Seoul and Busan.
Table GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRY
(%)
1974 1977
No. of No. of Value No. of No. of Value
enterprises workers added enterprises workers added
Seoul and Pusan 34.6 48.7 44.5 38.6 46.2 37.5
Other regions 665.4 51.3 55.5 61.4 53.8 60.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey. EPB 1977.
While Seoul and Pusan remain the largest industrial centers, marginal
improvements have taken place between 1974 and 1977 in the redistribution of
industrial employment outside of these areas. This may be the first sign
that Government policies aimed at a better distribution of employment are
paying off. Government policies aiming at a reduction of the congestion of
Seoul and Pusan include severe restrictions on industrial expansion in these
two cities, a program of financial assistance for the relocation of
industries, the promotion of new industrial estates such as the Pohang,
Ulsan and Yeosu complexes and the Saemaeul Movement initiated in 1971 for
creating off-farm employment in rural areas.
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Factor Use and Efficiency
1.07 The main elements which have contributed to the expansion of the
manufacturing sector are the rate of investment and efficiency in factor
use, both capital and labor.
1.08 Gross Fixed Capital Formation. Over the period 1969-75,
manufacturing generally accounted for less than 20% of aggregate fixed capital
formation. Over the period 1975-77, it reached an average of 21.9%. In 1978,
total fixed investment increased by a phenomenal 40.5% in real terms; the
manufacturing sector outpaced this growth and reached 58.3% in real terms thus
increasing its share of total fixed investment to 23.8%. Within the
manufacturing sector the share of the heavy and chemical sector in total gross
domestic capital formation increased significantly from 46% in 1973 to 52.9%
in 1976 and 56.2% in 1978. The recent growth rates of GDCF substantially
exceed those projected in the FFYP; the revised plan for 1979-81 projects a
slowdown in the growth of GDCF from 30.1% for the period 1977/78 to 12.9% p.a.
Although no sectoral breakdown of investment is available, the manufacturing
sector is expected to increase further its share and manufacturing investment
should therefore grow at a slightly higher rate than aggregate investment.
1.09 Factor Efficiency. Efficiency of the manufacturing sector in
its utilization of capital investment can be measured by the incremental
capital to output ratio (ICOR). Calculations of ICORs with a one-year lag
show a gradual decline over the three consecutive periods 1961-66, 1966-71
and 1971-75, thus indicating increasing efficiency in the use of capital
investment. Inclusion of data for 1976 and 1977 raises the ICOR estimate
to 1.012/j for the period 1971-77 compared to 0.977 /1 for the period
19 71-75. This may reflect the higher capital intensity of investment in
manufacturing in recent years because of the larger share of the heavy and
chemical sectors. Efficiency in capital utilization is also evidenced by the
growth in industrial capacity utilization which reached an average of 7.2%
over the period 1963-71 and 3.4% p.a. over 1971-77. Capacity utilization had
reached by 1971 a level comparable to that of developed countries. Labor
productivity as measured by the ratio of value added per employee has been
increasing in all manufacturing subsectors over the period 1970-76 and was
sufficient to absorb wage increases. Over the period 1977-78, however,
productivity gains have lagged behind the rapid growth in real wages.
Financial Structure of Enterprises
1.10 Surveys of the capital structure of manufacturing enterprises
indicate a high reliance on debt financing. The average aggregate debt/
equity ratio of manufacturing enterprises which stood at 2.7:1 in 1973
following the financial measures of 1972 increased to 3.2:1 in 1974 and
/1 Based on 1970 constant prices.
averaged 3.6:1 over the period 19 76-78. The long-term debt/equity ratio,
however, reached only 1.5:1 in 1978, reflecting the larger share (58%) of
short-term borrowings in total borrowings. The average interest rate paid
on borrowings, short- and long-term, ranged from 12% to 13% c- -r the period
19 76-78. Profitability measured in terms of net income to total assets has
declined marginally from 3.2% in 1976 to 2.7% in 1978 but remained quite
satisfactory.
Industrial Policies
1.11 The phenomenal growth of the manufacturing sector was to a large
extent made possible by efficient and pragmatic government policies.
Incentive packages have been developed and adjusted over time to fit evolving
priorities for industrial development. With variable emphasis, policies
have aimed at the promotion of export industries, import substitution,
assistance to small and medium enterprises, geographic dispersal of industry
and in the last few years, promotion of skill-intensive sectors with a higher
technological content. Export promotion has been the major objective since
the early sixties until the recent past. Concerns have surfaced recently
about the desirability of maintaining the same degree of priority on export
expansion because of a potentially dangerous situation of export dependence
for the Korean economy and because of the inflationary impact of export
promotion in the face of rising domestic demand. Subsidies on exports have
continued to increase in absolute terms over the period 19 75-78 but were
insufficient to compensate for the loss of competitiveness induced by higher
Korean prices relative to its major trading partners. As a result, the real
effective exchange rate deteriorated sharply for Korean exporters over that
period.
1.12 Export Incentive System. Government incentives to exporting
industries include tax exemption, accelerated depreciation allowances,
refund of import duties on raw materials used for export production, deferred
payment of tariffs on equipment and access to subsidized credit. These
incentives are administered within the framework of an export targeting system
whereby exporting firms set for themselves certain export targets in agreement
with overall government objectives. A monthly conference is held to review
and adjust targets as well as government policies affecting their
imp lementation.
1.13 While the emphasis has clearly been on export promotion, key
import substitution industries have received substantial government support
in the form of partial tax and tariff exemptions, as well as protection from
competing imports. Production for the domestic market, however, has
generally been subject to higher duties, taxes, and interest charges on
borrowings. In 1977-78, the Government has relaxed a number of import
restrictions as part of an import liberalization program to be implemented
over a four-year period. Banned items have been abolished; since January 1,
1979, 69% of all import items are subject to automatic approval, 31% are
- 6 -
itrestricted"./l Tariff adjustments have also been introduced to improve the
competitiveness of import substituting industries. The simple average tariff
rate has been reduced from 36% to 25%.
Recent Performance
1.14 The performance of the Korean economy in the first two years
(1977-78) of the Fourth Five Year Plan (FFYP) period has exceeded the
ambitious plan targets. The average annual growth rate of GNP reached 11.5%
in real terms compared to the 9.5% envisaged in the plan for 1977 and 1978.
Due to unexpected gains in Korea's terms of trade, the real gross national
income grew by almost 28%, nearly reaching in two years the growth targeted
in the first three years of the FFYP. The per capita income in current US
dollars reached $1,242 in 1978. The growth rate of investment was twice as
high as that of GNP in 1977 and three times as high in 1978. With the
relative decline in the share of investments in inventories, the rate of
increase in gross fixed capital formation was even faster than in total
investment. Manufacturing, transport and dwellings accounted for 83% of the
increase in gross fixed capital formation in 1978. In spite of this
phenomenal growth in real investment during 1977-78, Korea's reliance on
foreign savings has declined compared to the 1972-76 period as a result of a
remarkable improvement in national savings. The national saving income
*ratio has increased from 18% in 1975 to 25.6% in 1977 and 27.2% in 1978.
1.15 The industrial sector has provided a major impetus to GNP
growth over the period 19 77-78. The growth rate of the manufacturing sector
averaged 17% p.a. in real terms over that two-year period, considerably
exceeding the FFYP target of 15.8% p.a. During the period 1977-78, the
overall rate of growth of employment reached 3.7% p.a. but manufacturing
employment grew at 6.1% p.a. Manufacturing accounted for 22.4% of total
employment in 1978. Real wages in the manufacturing sector increased at
an average of 19.5% during 1977-78, substantially in excess of productivity
gains which reached 11.3% p.a. This may to some extent reflect a tightening
of the labor market particularly the increasing demand for skilled labor.
Prospects
1.16 The stresses imposed on the Korean economy by the rapid pace of
growth over the period 1977-78 have prompted the Government to initiate a
stabilization program in April 1979. The FFYP has been revised accordingly
and a new Economic Management Plan was introduced for the remaining plan
period of 1979-81. The main elements of the Government's program include a
deliberate slowdown in GNP growth, reduction in the growth rate of credit
and money supply, a moderate pursuit of export growth and greater emphasis
/1 In early 1978, 54% of all items were subject to automatic approval,
41% were restricted and 5% were banned.
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on light industries geared to the domestic market. GNP growth is expected
to slow down from 11.5% to 9.3% during 1979-81. The growth of value added in
the manufacturing sector would decline from 19.7% in 1978 to an average of
13.5% for 19 ,-81. Domestic investment would also be reduced from 30% to
about 13% p.a. On January 12, 1980, Korea devalued the won by 16.55% from
W 485 to W 580 to the US dollar in an attempt to promote the competitiveness
of its exports. It is expected that such a measure will increase the momentum
of increased production and exports, which showed signs of slowing down in
the second half of 1979. The devaluation is one step towards achieving
an expanded economy based on enlarged exports, which will remain the engine
of economic growth.
2. THE SMALL INDUSTRY SECTOR
Definition
2.01 A support program aimed specifically at smaller enterprises was
initiated by the Government in the early 1960s with the enactment of the
Small and Medium Industry Cooperative Law, the Small and Medium Industries
Basic Act and the special act establishing the Small and Medium Industry
Bank (SMIB). These laws generally aimed at reducing overcompetition and at
fostering the modernization and rationalization of production by smaller
industries. No distinction is made in Korea between medium-sized and small
enterprises; both are entitled to the same degree of support. The cutoff
point between small and medium industries (SMI) and their larger competitors
has been adjusted upwards over time to take account of the economic
development of the country and of inflationary pressures. The present
limitation which has been in effect since January 1977 is set in terms of
employment or total assets as indicated below:
Sector Total assets or No. of employees
(W million)
Mining, manufacturing and
transportation 500 300 /a
Construction 500 50
Commerce and services 50 20
/a The 1979 Enforcement Decree of the Small and Medium Industry
Promotion Law raises the employment criterion to 500 for
selected industries including automobile parts, electronic products,
cycle parts, etc.
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In applying for financial assistance, enterprises which exceed both of the
above criteria must apply to the Korea Development Bank (KDB) which only
caters to large firms; enterprises which satisfy either of the above
criteria (and have more than five employees) can approach SMIB.
2.02 The Citizens National Bank (CNB) was established in 1972 for the
purpose of mobilizing household savings and for making available to its
depositors small consumer and business loans. The scope of its operations
has been gradually expanded to include payment guarantees, transactions in
foreign currency and, since 1977, borrowing and lending in foreign currency.
Over time, CNB has been placing increasing emphasis on lending for small
business'. ½"overnment regulations which limited its lending to enterprises
employing less than 50 persons have been relaxed in February 1977 to include
enterprises employing up to 100 persons. The smaller segment of SM¢ is
therefore eligible for financial assistance from both SMIB and CNB. In this
report the small-scale industry (SSI) sector is notionally defined as the
segment of SMI comprising enterprises employing up to 100 persons.
2.03 A sample survey of the SMI sector conducted in 1978 by the Korea
Federation of Small Business (KFSB) indicates a high correlation between
size of employment and total assets. The survey indicates that 92% of the
total number of enterprises employing up to 100 persons had assets of
less than W 200 million /1 and 98% had assets of less than W 500 million./l
Given the impact of inflation in the past two years, it can be assumed that
approximately 95% of the population of enterprises employing less than 100
persons would have assets of less t-han W 500 million in 1980 prices. Small
scale industries in Korea can therefore be defined as enterprises employing
less than 100 persons or having assets of less than W 500 million. The KFSB
survey also shows a correlation between an employment size of 50 persons and
assets of W 250 million (in 1980 prices). Indications are that an employment
size of 300 can be linked with a total asset size of W 1.5 to 2 billion which
shows that the delineation in terms of assets between size and large
industries currently in force (para. 2.01) might need to be revised upwards.
Role of SSI in the Korean Economy
2.04 Annex 1 summarizes recent trends in the contribution of small,
medium and large enterprises to the manufacturing sector./2 SSI enterprises
numbered 23,300 in 1977 or 87% of all manufacturing enterprises./3 In the
/1 In 1977 current prices.
/2 The following analysis defined enterprises with less than 100 workers
as small enterprises with 100 to 299 workers as medium and enter-
prises with over 300 workers as large.
/3 CNB's potential business clientele is however larger since it includes
nonmanufacturing sectors as well namely mining, construction,
transportation and trade.
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same year, SSI enterprises employed 480,000 persons or 25% of total
manufacturing employment and accounted for 16% of value added.
SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF MANUFACTURING, 1977
No. of estab- No. of Fixed capital
Employment lishments employees Value added formation
size ('000) (%) ('000) (%) (W bil.) (%) (W bil.) (%)
Small
(5-99) 23,299 87.0 480 25.0 886 15.8 145 10.9
Medium
(100-299) 2,382 8.9 403 21.0 929 16.6 220 16.5
Large
(over 300) 1,085 4.1 1,036 54.0 3,782 67.6 971 72.6
Total 26.766 100.0 1.919 100.0 5.597 100.0 1,336 100.0
Source: EPB, 1977 Survey of Mining and Manufacturing.
The share of SSI in total manufacturing investment reached 10.9% in 1977,
a ratio which has remained practically unchanged for the past four years
except in 1976 when it peaked at 13.5%. No separate statistics are
available to show SSI contribution to Korean exports, the export orientation
of the SMI sector (including SSI) however is quite impressive: while SMI
accounted for 31% of total manufacturing output in 1977, their share of
total commodity exports reached 36.2%. This strong performance reflects
to a large extent SMI responsiveness to government incentives for export
orientation. Particularly effective in this respect are the subcontracting
and cooperative arrangements whereby SMI improve the marketability of their
production. A CNB survey indicates that export sales accounted for 16% of
total SSI sales in 1976 with no more than 22% being exported directly by the
producer. About 60% of SSI sales were actually sold on order from other
firms or through subcontracting arrangements.
2.05 The following table shows the growth trends in small, medium
and large enterprises over the period 1963-77. In 1963, SSI was the
most important sector in terms of employment and generated 42% of total
manufacturing value added. Over the following decade, however, the emphasis
lay on the development of large industry whose rapid growth overshadowed the
SSI sector. In recent years however, SSI enterprises have received more
support and SSI value added has been growing at an average of 40% p.a. over
the past five years, about the same rate as for medium and large enterprises.
Labor productivity measured by the ratio of value added per employee reached
51% of productivity in large enterprises in 1977 compared to 47% in 1973.
Productivity gains in SSI have apparently more than kept pace with those
registered by larger enterprises.
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GROWTH RATES IN MANUFACTURING 1963-77
(% p.a.)
Employment Value Added
1963-68 1968-73 1973-77 1963-68 1968-73 1973-77
Small
(5-99 workers) 7.7 0.2 9.5 26.3 22.8 39.6
Medium ( ( ( (
(100-299 workers) ( ( 18.4 ( ( 40.9
(19.1 (14.6 ( 43.8 ( 39.4
Large ( ( ( (
(over 300 workers) 13.8 42.8
Total 13.2 9.1 13.5 37.4 35.6 41.9
Source: EPB, 1977 Survey of Mining and Manufacturing.
Industrial Structure of SSI Sector
2.06 The subsectoral distribution of value added and employment by
size of enterprise in 1977 is summarized below. In 1977, the four
subsectors of textiles, fabricated metals, food products and chemicals
together accounted for 71.5% of value added and 74.3% of employment in the
SSI sector. While the sectoral distribution is not substantially different
for medium and larger enterprises, it is interesting to note that the
dependence on these four subsectors increases with the size of enterprises
to reach 80% in medium industries and 83% in large industries for both value
added and employment. Labor productivity within the SSI sector is lowest in
textiles and highest in chemicals and nonmetallic minerals.
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STRUCTURE OF THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 1977
(%)
Value added Employment
Small Medium Large Total Small Medium Large Total
/a b /c /a /b C
Food, beverages,
tobacco 15.9 20.1 19.6 19.1 12.3 7.2 7.9 8.8
Textiles,
clothing,
leather 20.2 23.4 18.5 19.6 28.8 41.6 34.0 34.3
Wood and wood
products 4.9 1.5 2.1 2.5 5.2 1.7 3.7 3.7
Paper and paper
products 7.1 4.8 3.3 4.2 7.6 4.4 2.9 4.4
Chemicals,
rubber,
plastics 15.1 17.3 19.4 18.3 10.3 9.3 14.6 12.4
Nonmetallic
minerals 9.7 7.6 3.6 5.2 5.0 5.2 3.1 4.0
Basic metals 3.9 3.4 6.9 5.8 3.4 3.3 4.0 3.7
Machinery and
equipment 20.3 18.8 25.2 23.4 22.9 21.8 26.2 24.5
Other 2.9 3.1 1.4 1.9 4.5 5.5 3.6 4.2
Total
Manufacturing 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
/a Enterprises employing 5-99 workers.
/b Enterprises employing 100-299 workers.
/c Enterprises employing over 300 workers.
Source: EPB. Report on Mining and Manufacturing, 1977.
Regional Distribution of SSI
2.07 The following table shows that in 1977 SSI employment was less
concentrated in the main industrial areas of Seoul, Pusan and Gyonggi than
either medium or large industries. SSI employment outside these areas
reached 40% in 1977, compared with 31% only for medium and large enter-
prises.
- 12 -
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MANUFACTURING, 1977
(%)
Value added Employment
Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
Seoul 30.8 26.0 23.3 30.3 30.1 26.1
Busan 13.3 13.6 12.1 12.4 15.3 22.0
Gyeonggi province 19.3 26.9 22.3 17.2 23.4 20.6
Other regions 36.6 33.5 42.2 40.1 31.2 31.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: EPB. Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey, 1977.
It is interesting to note however that the share of large industry
employment in Seoul and Pusan has been declining rapidly from 56% in 1972 to
50.5% in 1976 and 46.7% in 1977. This trend is the consequence of
Government restrictions on the establishment of new large industries in
these two cities and of a concerted policy of relocation of existing plants.
Paradoxically, small and medium industries which are not subject to the same
restrictions show an increased concentration in the Seoul area.
Fixed Capital Formation in SSI
2.08 Additions to fixed assets in the SSI sector can be estimated on
the basis of the manufacturing surveys conducted annually by EPB. According
to these surveys, fixed asset investment in the manufacturing sector
increased in current terms from W 589 billion in 1974 to W 1,336 billion in
1977 which represents an average annual growth rate of 31.5%. Over the same
period, SSI fixed assets investment fluctuated in relative terms but reached W
145 billion or 10.9% of total manufacturing investment in 1977 compared to W
65 billion or 11% in 1974. Over the four-year period 1974-77, SSI investment
has kept pace with overall fixed capital formation in manufacturing. No
drastic change is expected in the coming years. National income statistics
show an upsurge in manufacturing investment of 67.5% in current terms
in 1978; on that basis SSI fixed investment would have reached W 243 billion
in 1978. Based on the revised objectives of the Economic Management
Plan for the period 1979-81, manufacturing investment can be expected to
grow at a minimum average of 15% p.a. in current terms. SSI investment
should keep pace with this rate of growth and reach W 280 billion in 1979,
W 320 billion in 1980 and W 370 billion in 1981.
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2.09 The BOK 1978 analysis of the financial structure of manufacturing
enterprises suggests that investment in land and buildings accounts for about
40% of SMI fixed assets with the remaining 60% allocated to machinery and
equipment. Another survey of SSI investment by CNB shows that similar ratios
prevail in the small industry sector and indicates that foreign currency
expenditures account for about 25% of total SSI investment in machinery and
equipment. The foreign exchange demand of SSI sector for the period 1979-81
can therefore be estimated as follows:
1978 1979 1980 1981
Total SSI fixed investment
(W billion) 243 280 320 370
Total SSI investment in
machinery and equipment
(W billion) 146 168 192 222
Foreign exchange demand
(US$ million) 75.3 86.6 99.0 114.4
2.10 Until 1978, SMIB was the only source of foreign exchange finance
for SSI investment. Over the period 1976-78, the SSI sector /1 accounted
for approximately 40% of SMIB's foreign exchange lending, reaching a high
of US$42 million in 1978. SMIB's foreign exchange lending is expected to
expand at a rate of 7% p.a. over the coming years thus reaching US$45
million in 1979, US$48 million in 1980 and US$51 million in 1981. SMIB's
supply of foreign exchange would therefore cover less than half of estimated
SSI demand. The gap between supply and demand would reach US$41.6 million
in 1979, US$51 million in 1980 and US$63.4 million in 1981. CNB having
started its foreign currency lending operations in 1979 is expected to cover
a part of this gap.
Financial Structure of SSI
2.11 An analysis of the financial structure and performance of SSI
enterprises is available from SMIB's annual surveys of the SMI sector. The
ratio of fixed assets to total assets was surprisingly high in 1977 for very
small SMI enterprises but declined rapidly with size (74% for enterprises
having 5 to 9 workers, 54% for 10-19 and 46% for 20-49). BOK statistics for
/1 i.e. enterprises employing less than 100 workers.
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1978 show an average fixed assets ratio of 36% for the SMI sector /1 well
below the 50% recorded by large enterprises./2 Assuming that the fixed
assets ratio can be considered as a reliable indicator of production
capacity and of capital utilization in the manufacturing sector, it appears
that medium sized enterprises employing 100 to 300 workers are more
efficient than both smaller and larger units. The total debt/equity ratio
of SSI enterprises is very low reaching only 0.3:1 for enterprises with less
than 9 workers and rising gradually to 1.8:1 for enterprises with 50-100
workers. These figures reflect the high reliance of SSI on self-financing;
in 1977, the ratio of net worth to total assets reached 77% for 5-9 workers
and declined to 36% for 50-100 workers. The unorganized money market (UMM)
however accounted for a minor share of 6-14% (increasing in smaller
enterprises) of total borrowings. Data on the source of funds of SSI
investment confirm that in 1977 self-financing accounted for 60% of SSI
fixed asset investments and the UMM for about 1.3%. In 1978, however,
resources available to smaller SSI enterprises from financial institutions
declined in relative terms and UMM borrowings financed about 8% of
investment by enterprises with 5-20 workers. The profitability of SSI
enterprises is markedly higher than for larger enterprises. Return on total
assets reached 12% for the 5-9 worker category in 1977 and declined to 7.6%
for 10-19 workers, 6.8% for 20-49 workers and 5.1% for 50-100 workers. By
comparison, the same ratio stood at 2.6% for large enterprises.
Government Support for SSI
2.12 As indicated above, there is no Government assistance program
aimed specifically at the smaller end of the SMI sector. Since the early
1960s, however, the Government has launched a number of programs and
established institutions which support the "nonlarge" sector of industries
labelled small and medium for the sake of convenience. CNB is the only
institution which is limited to providing financial assistance to smaller
enterprises with less than 50 workers until 1977 and less than 100 since
then. The following paragraphs accordingly review the programs of
government support for the SMI sector as a whole.
Nonfinancial Support of SMI
2.13 The Small and Medium Industry Basic Law, enacted in 1966, provides
the main orientations of government support in favor of SMI enterprises.
The primary objectives for the sector are (a) improvements in the production
process and quality of SMI; (b) protection of SMI from unfair competition by
larger industries; (c) establishment of linkages with larger industries; and
/1 i.e. enterprises employing 5 to 299 workers.
/2 employing over 300 workers.
- 15 -
(d) promotion of cooperative efforts. The Law also provides that
appropriate amounts of financial assistance should be supplied to support
these objectives. The Bureau of Small and Medium Industry of the Ministry
of Commerce and Industry is responsible for implementation of the Basic Law.
The SMI Bureau is expected to gather general information on the status and
development of the SMI sector and to assist in the formulation of government
policies. The Bureau also monitors the performance of the specialized
institutions, both technical and financial which cater to the needs of the
sector. In practice, the limited staff of the SMI Bureau and the fact that
SMIB and CNB are supervised by the Ministry of Finance has substantially
constrained the efficiency of the Bureau in its efforts to coordinate the
delivery of technical and financial assistance to SMI. In order to
alleviate these shortcomings, new legislation was enacted in late 1978. The
Small and Medium Industry Promotion Law provides for the establishment of a
Small and Medium Industry Promotion Corporation (SMIPC) as an independent
government entity in charge of promoting the modernization of SMI operations
and of supporting SMI cooperative projects.
2.14 The Small and Medium Industry Promotion Corporation. Established
in January 1979, SMIPC operates under the direct supervision of the SMI
Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Over time, the Government
expects SMIPC to develop into a powerful national agency in charge of
implementing policies for the development of the SMI sector. SMIPC can
therefore be expected to develop gradually its capability to supervise and
coordinate the delivery of technical and financial assistance to SMI by the
various specialized agencies. At present, however, SMIPC still is a very
young institution with limited capabilities. SMIPC's major activities cover
(a) financing and implementing the modernization of specific SMI projects in
priority sectors as defined by MCI; (b) financing and implementing such
cooperative activities as industrial estates and common processing
facilities; (c) delivery of managerial and technological assistance through
on-site extension services and staff training; and (d) research and
publication of data on the SMI sector as a whole and on specific industrial
subsectors.
2.15 In order to carry out these functions, SMIPC has recruited capable
professionals, mostly with an engineering background, and has been able to
offer a very competitive salary scale relative to other government institu-
tions. Its total staff reached 151 at end October 1979 of which about 100
were professionals. Recruitment of about 50 more engineers is planned for
1980. Government expectations from the establishment of SMIPC can be
measured by the size of the financial resources made available to it mainly
from annual budgetary resources. These resources /1 reached W 26.5 billion
/1 Called the SMI Promotion Fund.
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in 1979 and comprised (i) W 15.7 billion /1 in funds loanable to individual
SMI projects through SMIB; (ii) W 5.5 billion for cooperative and industrial
estate projects; (iii) W 1.6 billion for administrative expenses; and (iv)
W 3.7 billion for extension services and training. Total resources avail-
able to SMIPC in 1980 as Promotion Fund are expected to reach W 31.3 bil-
lion, including W 16.5 billion in loanable funds. The use of loanable
resources available from the Promotion Fund is restricted in the Enforcement
Decree of the SMI Promotion Act to enterprises employing more than 50
workers and having assets of more than W 100 million. The upper limit of
300 workers normally applicable to SMI enterprises has been raised for
specific industries to 500 workers.
2.16 Korea Federation of Small Business (KFSB). Established in 1962 in
accordance with the SMI Cooperative Act, the Federation is the apex
institution for SMI provincial and national cooperatives. At end-July 1979,
16,100 SMI firms held membership in one of the 181 cooperatives controlled
by the Federation. The main activities of the Federation comprise joint
purchases and sales to member enterprises, delivery of technical and
managerial assistance and compilation of data and surveys of the SMI sector
as a whole.
2.17 Promotion of Rural Industries. Beginning in the early 1970s, the
Government has been placing greater emphasis on the creation of off-farm
employment. The Saemaeul Program incorporates various elements including
one directed at the establishment of SMI projects in rural areas. By end
August 1979, a total of 651 factories had been identified as Saemaeul
projects and 509 had been completed. Total employment creation was
estimated at about 70,000. For 1980, establishment of 100 new Saemaeul
factories is being planned.
2.18 In addition to the Saemaeul Program, the Government has been
encouraging a better regional dispersal of industries by sponsoring and
financing industrial estates reserved for SMI. By end-1978, there were 11
such estates operating in Korea. SMIPC is now expected to take the lead in
planning and establishing new industrial estates and common processing
facilities for SMI. To increase its effectiveness, SMIPC has recently
proposed to the Government a revision of the cumbersome and ineffective
legislation currently applying to the establishment of industrial estates.
2.19 Other Programs. The Government has launched a number of programs
aimed at supporting specific objectives and activities within the SMI sec-
tor. The 1975 SMI-Affiliation Law aims at promoting linkages between large
and smaller enterprises. So far, 37 large enterprises have established
/L W 15.4 billion for working capital and W 0.3 billion for equipment
purchases.
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such relations with some 157 SMI units operating in 5 industrial activities.
Firm contracts subject to government approval and control must be
established between large firms and their suppliers. In addition, the
Government has reserved 23 activities /1 for SMI firms only. In 1976, the
Government also initiated a program of assistance to SMI machinery
producers. Five hundred enterprises would be selected from priority sub-
sectors between 1976 and 1981; by end 1978, 200 had been identified.
2.20 An area in which government programs have not been very successful
is technical and managerial assistance. In 1979, the Ministry of Commerce
and Industry had accredited seven institutions /2 which were expected to
deliver on-site guidance and provide training to the workers of SMI
enterprises. A total of 3,335 firms were expected to receive on-site
guidance. The number of firms to be assisted ranged from 5 for CNB to 2,200
for the Chamber of Industry. By end-August 1979, no more than 860 had
actually been assisted. Several of the agencies expected to assist SMI
enterprises are not equipped to do so efficiently. Most of them cater to a
particular segment of the SMI sector and duplication is almost inevitable.
It seems that an urgent task of reorganization and coordination needs to be
undertaken by the Government in the area of technical assistance to SMI.
Financial Institutions Supporting SMI
2.21 Financial assistance programs are discussed in para. 2.19. The
institutional framework for the delivery of financial assistance to the SMI
sector comprises SMIB, CNB and the Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KCGF). In
addition to these institutions which specialize in assisting the SMI
sector,/3 the commercial banks also provide a large proportion of the
financial resources, albeit mostly short-term, to Korean SMI.
2.22 The Small and Medium Industry Bank (SMIB). Established in 1961,
SMIB is a government-owned institution /4 geared specifically to meet the
financial and to a lesser extent technical assistance requirements of SMI.
Its mandate encompasses assistance to entrepreneurs employing 5 to 300 em-
ployees. SMIB's total loan portfolio reached W 457 billion (US$942 million)
/1 Such as knitted toys and printing.
/2 Comprising the Industry Advancement Administration of the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry, SMIPC, the Korea Federation of Small Business,
the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Korea Credit Guarantee
Fund, CNB, and SMIB.
/3 Except for KCGF which also issues guarantees for large-scale priority
industries (45% of outstanding guarantees).
/4 The Government owns 99.9% of SMIB's share capital.
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at end-1978 and SMIB's clientele comprised 17,000 of the 27,000 SMI
enterprises in the manufacturing sector. The Government has recently au-
thorized an increase in SMIB's authorized share capital from W 30 billion to
W 100 billion in order to allow a further expansion of its lending
operations. SMIB's disbursements of term loans for equipment financing
reached about US$195 million in 1978 of which about 54% was in foreign
exchange. On average, approximately 46% of SMIB's total term lending over
the period 1976-78 has gone to the SSI sector defined as enterprises
employing up to 100 workers. SMIB's long-term lending to the SSI sector
reached W 35 billion in 1978 compared to W 17.1 billion for CNB.
2.23 The Citizens National Bank (CNB). Established in 1962, CNB has
been very successful in attracting deposits from small savers. Its total
deposits reached W 1,010 billion at end-September 1979. Its loan portfolio,
short- and long-term, reached W 523 billion or 52% at the same date because
of restrictions imposed by MOF on its lending operations. CNB's total loan
disbursements reached W 341 billion in 1978 of which W 170 million (50%) was
for SSI and the balance for consumer financing. Of CNB's total SSI lending,
about 10% was in the form of term loans (subject to a maximum maturity of
five years). In 1979, CNB received a foreign currency loan of US$10 million
from ADB. These resources as well as the proposed US$30 million Bank loan
would enable CNB to cover partly the existing gap between demand and supply
of foreign currency resources in the SSI sector.
2.24 Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KCGF). Formerly operated by SMIB,
the KCGF became an independent institution in 1976. The KCGF is authorized
to issue guarantees with a maximum outstanding amount of 15 times its share
capital which reached W 96.2 billion at end-July 1979. Total outstanding
guarantees reached W 543 billion at that date with 52% extended to SMI
enterprises./l About 80% of KCGF guarantees are for working capital loans.
Average guarantee size reached W 26 million in 1978. Separate figures for
SSI industries are not available. Eighty percent of KCGF's share capital at
end-1978 came from annual remittances from deposit money banks equivalent to
0.5% of their outstanding loan portfolio. The balance consisted primarily
of retained earnings. KCGF charges an annual fee of 1% on loan guarantees
payable by the subborrower. Guarantee coverage by KCGF is limited to W 1
billion for large industrial and W 500 million for SMI. Guarantees are
available for projects with insufficient collateral; the KCGF is not
expected to give any guarantee coverage on the basis of risk.
/1 The KCGF Act stipulates that at least 40% of guarantees outstanding
should be for the SMI sector.
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Flow of Funds to SMI
2.25 The Korean SMI sector receives direct financial support from (a)
the commercial banks (nationwide and local banks); (b) the Small and
Medium Industry Bank; and (c) the Citizens National Bank. The following
table shows a breakdown by source of funds of SMI loans outstanding over
the period 1976-November 30, 1979.
LOANS OUTSTANDING TO SMI SECTOR
(in W billion)
1976 1977 1978 1979
Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount %
Nationwide banks 437.5 45 632.3 48 908.6 48 1,295.4 50
Local banks 146.4 15 204.8 15 273.0 15 358.3 14
SMIB 225.4 23 296.5 22 456.9 24 613.9 24
CNB 166.5 17 193.4 15 237.5 13 305.2 12
Total 975.8 100 1,327.0 100 1,876.0 100 2,572.8 100
It is apparent from the above table that commercial banks represent the
major source of financial support for SMI with nearly two-thirds of the
total SMI portfolio. To a large extent, this results from a BOK requirement
that SMI lending account for 30% of the loan portfolio of nationwide
banks./1 Most of these loans however are short-term. The lending rate
applicable to these loans is the standard rate of 18.5% p.a. for loans under
three years and 19.5% over three years. SMIB has been able over the period
1976/77 to maintain a 22-24% share of outstanding SMI loans. It is
estimated that approximately 45% of its loans were extended to small
enterprises employing less than 100 persons and 55% to medium sized
ventures.
2.26 CNB's share in total SMI lending has been declining regularly over
the past three years to a point where its outstanding SSI portfolio barely
exceeds the estimated SSI component of SMIB's portfolio. This is primarily
due to the very tight credit ceilings imposed by MOF on CNB's lending
operations. These ceilings effectively prevent CNB from using for lending
purposes all the resources it mobilizes from depositors.
2.27 An important feature of SNI lending is that contrary to other
directed lending programs undertaken by financial institutions at the
/1 40% in the case of local banks.
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request of the Government, only a minor portion can be considered as sub-
sidized credit. Net increases in SMI lending operations had been projected
by BOK at W 300 billion for 1979. Of this total, the subsidized SMI Low
Interest Fund channelled by SMIB at 15% p.a. amounted to W 60 billion or
20%. In addition, SMIB has been operating since early 1979 as the lending
channel for the SMI Promotion Fund /i (para. 2.14) whose proceeds are onlent
to borrowers at rates of 10% to 15% with a 2% spread accruing to SMIB.
3. THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
Financing Long-Term Capital Investment
3.01 Inspite of some recourse to rolling over of short-term borrowings
by and large Korean enterprises except for the SSI sector have had reasonable
access to long-term resources /2 to finance their investments. These
resources comprise internally generated funds, including additional equity
financing from shareholders and external resources, i.e. borrowings. BOK
surveys of fund flow statements of manufacturing enterprises and other
studies of investment patterns in Korea suggest that internally generated
funds account for as much as 50% of GDCF in the SSI sector and about 40% for
larger firms. It can be inferred from these studies that, on average, self-
financing accounts for about 45% of manufacturing GDCF. External sources
which comprise both domestic institutional sources (bank and nonbank) and
noninstitutional sources (capital markets, direct borrowings from abroad and
the UMM) provide the 55% balance of GDCF. Based on current price GDCF,
total financial resources raised externally by Korean manufacturing enter-
prises in 1978 could be estimated at W 850 billion.
3.02 Findings of the Financial Sector Mission, which visited Korea in
November 1979, show that in 1978 institutional sources of funds in Korea
provided incremental long-tenn resources aggregating W 591 billion; this
represented 67% of total resources mobilized externally for financing
manufacturing investment. Noninstitutional sources provided the remaining
W 259 billion. Among these, corporate debentures issued on the capital
market provided more than half.
3.03 The above figures indicate that institutional sources of funds
are the second largest source of long-term funds for the manufacturing
sector after self-financing. This role has been growing in importance over
the past few years; annual increments in outstanding term loans of financial
/1 W 15.7 billion in 1979.
/2 i.e. resources whose maturity exceeds one year.
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institutions to the manufacturing sector have grown at an average annual
rate of 50% over the period 1976-78, compared to a growth in manufacturing
GDCF of 42% p.a. As a result, increments in term loans outstanding which
accounted for 29% of manufacturing GDCF in 1975 reached 38% in 1978.
3.04 A tremendous expansion was also recorded in the corporate bond
market. The volume of funds raised by placement of debentures on the
securities market has grown by an average of 95% p.a. over the 1975-78
period. Corporate bond issues by manufacturing sector firms reached nearly
W 241 billion in 1978 /1 compared to W 32 billion in 1975.
Financing Short-Term Requirements
3.05 The supply of long-term resources represents only part of the
support which institutional sources of funds provide to the manufacturing
sector. Manufacturing firms rely primarily on financial institutions,
including short term finance companies, for the supply of short-term
resources to cover their working capital requirements. Other sources of
funds are practically limited to the unorganized money market. As a
consequence, short-term lending operations represent a major part of the
portfolio of Korean financial institutions./2 Over the period 1976-78,
short-term operations accounted for 66% of the increases in the total
outstanding portfolio of financial institutions /3 and increments in the
outstanding short-term portfolio of financial institutions have grown at an
average of 59% p.a., faster than the 50% growth in term lending.
Institutional Sources of Funds
3.06 The institutional set-up of the Korean financial sector can be
divided into banking (or monetary) institutions which accept deposits from
the general public and nonbank financial institutions. Banking institutions
are also called "deposit money banks" (DMBs); they comprise conventional
commercial banks including branches of foreign banks and six specialized
banks./4
/1 Part of the new issues however aimed at replacing maturings debentures.
/1 Except for KDFC and insurance companies which specializes in long-term
lending operations.
/2 And 86% of the aggregate portfolio of commercial banks.
/3 The Korean Exchange Bank for foreign trade; the Small and Medium
Industry Bank for SMI; the Citizens National Bank for consumer finance
and SSI; the Korea Housing Bank for housing finance; the National
Agricultural Corporation Federation for agricultural credits and the
National Fisheries Cooperative.
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The operations of commercial banks are directly supervised by the Bank of
Korea (BOK) while specialized banks are under the control of the Ministry of
Finance (MOF).
3.07 Over the period 1975-78, some deepening of the financial sector
has taken place with the growing importance of nonbanking institutions.
The share of nonbank financial institutions in the total gross assets of
the financial sector reached 27% in 1978 compared to 23% in 1975. This
sign of maturing notwithstanding, the banking system still accounted for
73% of the sector's total assets in 1978 and BOK and the commercial banks
together accounted for 50% of total assets in the financial sector.
Deposit Money Banks
3.08 The Commercial Banks. The commercial banking sector in Korea
comprises: (a) five Government controlled commercial banks with a nationwide
network of branches; (b) ten banks with operations localized in each
province; and (c) branches of foreign commercial banks. In aggregate, the
assets of commercial banks accounted for 36.9% of the total assets of the
financial sector in 1978 down from 37.7% in 1975; this component ratio could
be broken down into 30.1% for the five nationwide banks, 4.1% for the ten
regional banks and 2.7% for branches of foreign banks. The commercial
banking group remains by far the largest source of funds of the manufacturing
sector, but its importance has been slowly declining over time. The com-
mercial banks accounted for 65% of the increase in outstanding loans to the
manufacturing sector during 1978 compared to 73% in 1974. Their operations,
however, are heavily skewed towards short-term lending. In 1978, short-term
loans reached close to 90% of the increase in the total commercial bank
portfolio. In the same year, the commercial banks supplied only 21% of
the increase in the aggregate long-term portfolio of the financial sector as
a whole. By comparison, the Korea Development Bank (KDB), which is the
largest nonbank financial institution in Korea, accounted for 33%.
3.09 Deposits represent the major source of funds of commercial banks.
In 1978, demand and savings deposits together accounted for 54.3% of their
total aggregate liabilities (including equity). This ratio actually was
substantially lower than the 71.1% reached in 1970. Demand deposits have
marginally increased their share of total resources to 21.4% but time and
savings deposits have declined regularly from 52.4% in 1970 to 32.9% in
1978. This sharp decline can be related to the 1972 reduction in interest
rates and the resulting negative real deposit rates.
3.10 Specialized Banks. The six specialized banks were established
by the Government in the early 1960s to service particular economic
sectors. Their aggregate assets accounted for 22.8% of the total assets of
the financial sector in 1978 down from 23.6% in 1975. The Korea Exchange
Bank, which was established in 1967 to take over the commercial foreign
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exchange transactions of BOK, accounts for more than half the total assets
of specialized banks. Demand and savings deposits represent the main source
of funds of specialized banks and accounted for 56% of their total liabili-
ties and equity at mid-1978.
Nonbank Financial Intermediaries
3.11 The declining share of the monetary system, i.e., specialized
banks, commercial banks, and BOK /1 in the total assets of the financial
sector reflects a certain deepening of the sector linked to the growing
importance of nonbank financial institutions. The average annual growth
rate of the assets of nonbank financial institutions, reached 24% in real
terms over the period 1975-78 compared to an average of 17.3% for the
financial sector as a whole. Their share of total assets therefore
increased from 23.2% in 1975 to 27.1% in 1978. Nonbank financial inter-
mediaries comprise: (a) four development banks /2 of which the Korea
Development Bank (KDB) is by far the largest; (b) the trust account of the
Bank of Seoul and Trust; (c) life and nonlife insurance companies; (d)
short-term finance companies (STFC); (e) mutual savings and finance
companies; (f) postal savings accounts; and (g) securities firms. Out of
the seven types of nonbank intermediaries, development banks constitute the
largest group as they account for 64% of total assets of nonbank
intermediaries.
3.12 The Bank Group is associated with the two development banks active
in the industrial sector: KDB and the Korea Development Finance Corporation
(KDFC)./3 KDB is the single largest financial institution in Korea. As
the principal agent of government financing programs in the industrial
sector, it deals primarily with large public and private sector enterprises.
Because of the relatively large share of power and transportation projects
in its portfolio, the manufacturing sector accounted for 40% of all loans
outstanding at end-1978, a lower proportion than for other Korean financial
Institutions. The privately-owned KDFC also finances relatively large
industrial enterprises. Its clientele is restricted to the private sector
and until now it has been providing almost exclusively long-term resources
/1 BOK's share of financial sector assets declined from 15.5% in 1975 to
13.2% in 1978.
/2 The Korea Development Bank; the Korea Development Finance Corporation;
the Korea Export-Import Bank; and the Land Bank.
/3 The Bank has also made three loans available to SMIB and is proposing
that a first loan be considered for CNB. Both institutions are con-
sidered as deposit money banks because they accept deposits from the
general public. A relatively large part of their operations is, in
fact, development financing.
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in foreign currencies. In response to rising demands for domestic currency
financing, KDFC is in the process of being converted into a long-term credit
bank which should, inter alia, ensure its access to larger amounts of
long-term domestic currency resources.
Noninstitutional Sources of Funds
3.13 Noninstitutional sources of funds include the unorganized money
market (UMM) which is primarily a source of short-term resources. Estimates
of the importance of the UMM are made difficult by the very nature of trans-
actions and by the fact that a substantial part of the lending operations of
short-term finance companies actually represent "recycled" UMM resources.
Medium-term suppliers' or buyers' credits have been a substantial source of
funds for Korean industries. These direct borrowings from abroad might
actually be considered as an institutional source of funds since their
availability is usually dependent upon a counterguarantee from a local
bank.
3.14 Other noninstitutional sources of funds comprise direct foreign
equity investments and the domestic securities market. Direct foreign
investments are restricted by the Government to specific sectors and reached
about US$77 million in 1978. The stock and bond markets, particularly
the latter, have developed over the past few years into a major source of
funds for the manufacturing sector. The importance of the stock market as a
source of term finance has fluctuated during the 1970s. Stock market
activity expanded rapidly through ihe mid-70s as a result of government
incentives to induce firms to go public. The main incentive was in the form
of a 13% tax differential which has been reduced to 5% since 1978. New
listings increased by 10% only in 1978 and no new listings were registered
in 1979. Trading declined and the stock price index plummeted from 202.8 at
end-1978 to 178.2 as of September 30, 1979. Funds raised by manufacturing
enterprises on the stock market reached about W 141.1 billion in 1978.
3.15 Since 1977, the corporate bond market has been supplying more
resources to the manufacturing sector than the stock market. In 1978, the
sale of bonds reached US$497 million compared to US$55 million in 1974. The
effective yield of bonds varies from 25.5 to 27.4% for a 1-3 year maturity.
The rapid growth of the bond market is to a large extent due to the
favorable tax treatment granted to buyers for income derived from the
purchase of bonds.
Government Control and Direction
3.16 The operations of the financial sector in Korea are characterized
by close Government control on the institutions themselves and on their
allocation of funds. The Government directly owns controlling participa-
tions in the share capital of four of the five nationwide commercial banks
and indirectly controls the fifth one. The Governent also has majority
holdings in the specialized banks and is in full control of the Korea
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Development Bank. The top management of these institutions is usually
appointed directly by the highest authority under recommendation by the
Minister of Finance.
3.17 Directed Credit. Government controls are most pervasive in the
area of fund allocation. The Government through the BOK and MOF manages a
system of "directed" lending, whereby funds are allocated to specific
priority sectors, subsectors or individual project enterprises in line with
macro-economic objectives. The financial intermediaries are the implementing
agencies of this directed lending program.
3.18 The selective credit programs include the support of export
activities as the highest priority, the restructuring of the industrial
sector with emphasis on heavy and chemical industries and assistance to
smaller manufacturing enterprises. These lending programs are channelled
through the deposit money banks, primarily the commercial banks, and through
KDB. They are made available to borrowers primarily in the form of
short-term credits for export loans and medium- to long-term credits for
other types of directed lending. There is increasing doubt about the
adequacy of maintaining the rigid system of directed lending in Korea
because of the growing complexity of the economy and the resulting need for
responsive fine tuning. There is no question however that this system has
largely contributed in the past to the phenomenal growth and transformation
of the industrial sector.
3.19 Subsidized Credit. An imuportant feature of directed credits is
the interest rate subsidy attached to most of these loans, a notable
exception being the SMI loans of commercial banks. Prior to January 12,
1980, loans for export were generally available at 9% p.a. Equipment loans
carried a rate of 15% to 16% compared to a standard rate of 18.5% to 20.5%.
Export credit accounted for 62% of all subsidized loans outstanding with
deposit money banks at end-1978. KDB handles primarily subsidized loans
funded from the National Investment Fund (NIF). These loans accounted for 46%
of KDB's total lending to the manufacturing sector in 1978. Including other
types of selective credits, 67.6% of KDB's lending in 1978 was in the form of
subsidized loans. By comparison, subsidized lending by deposit money banks
accounted for 40% of their manufacturing loan portfolio at end-1978.
3.20 Close to 72% of subsidized credits outstanding with deposit money
banks at end-1978 were funded from their own resources but were re-
discountable with BOK. Government funded programs represented 8% and NIF
resources /1 20%. In spite of the negative spread between the average cost
of deposit resources and the lending rate for export loans, the
profitability of commercial banks is not overly affected since these loans
can be rediscounted with BOK with a 5% positive spread for 80% of their
value.
/1 Which originate primarily from deposits earmarked by DMlBs for the
purchase NIF bonds.
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Lending Rates and Inflation
3.21 The system of subsidized lending described above aims at (a)
improving the competitiveness of Korean exports; and (b) improving financial
returns to potential investors in economically desirable projects. The
efficacy of this system of subsidized lending is being increasingly
questioned, not only because of the negative interest spreads accruing to
the financial sector as a whole in view of the higher costs of deposits but
also because of potential misallocations of funds. Criticism has also been
voiced about the inability of the financial sector to improve the level of
national savings primarily because of negative real interest rates on
deposits. In order to restore the savings ratio to its 1969-73 level of
21-23% of GNP, it is argued that a 5% premium over the expected rate of
inflation is desirable. In January 1980 the Government raised interest
rates sharply (the prime lending rate, for example, rose from 18.5% to
24.5%) on both deposits and loans. The new interest rate structure
(Annex 4), apart from its anti-inflationary objective, is expected to enable
the banking institutions in Korea to achieve better results in their efforts
to mobilize savings.
4. THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
A. INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
Legal Framework and Ownership
4.01 The Citizens National Bank (CNB) was set up in December 1962
under the Citizens National Bank Act and started its business operations
in February 1963. CNB itself evolved from the National Citizen Bank
of Korea (NCBK) which was established in 1962 by consolidating a number of
small mutual finance institutions dealing with petty finance. NCBK was con-
verted into CNB so as to set up a broad-based financial institution within
the framework of government policies to meet the financial needs of consumers
and small businesses, while at the same time attracting small household
savings as part of a national effort to raise domestic capital for economic
development. The CNB Act governs CNB's broad operating policy, scope of
operations, administration and capitalization. Under the Act, CNB is
empowered to carry out all activities normally carried out by a commercial
bank and it also has the unique authority to operate a Mutual Installment
Savings and Remuneration Scheme. The Act is supplemented by an Enforcement
Decree, Articles of Incorporation and internal regulations. The Act has
been amended several times, most recently in December 1977 when CNB's
authorized share capital was increased from W 5 billion to W 30 billion, and
CNB was authorized to borrow and lend in foreign currencies.
/1 Which originate primarily from deposits earmarked by DMBs for the
purchase NIF bonds.
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4.02 The Government is the major shareholder in CNB. At September 30,
1979 the Government held 65.6% of CNB's paid-in capital of W 5 billion;/l
5 nationwide commercial banks, also owned mainly by the Government, held a
further 34.1%, with the remaining 0.3% held by private interests (see
Annex 5).
4.03 Under the CNB Act, the senior management of CNB (President, Deputy
President, Auditor and Directors) are appointed by the Government which must
also approve CNB's Annual Operational Plan. In broad policy matters, CNB is
under the supervision of the MOF whose approval is required for establishing
branches, altering the Articles of Incorporation, suspending business or
merging with another institution. As a banking institution, CNB is further
subject to supervision by the Bank of Korea, particularly concerning its
commercial banking activities including deposit mobilization, bill
discounting, and liquidity ratios, all of which are regulated by the General
Banking Act. Within this broad supervisory framework, CNB's management is
independent in its conduct of CNB's operations.
Management and Or_anization
4.04 The management of CNB rests with a full-time Board of Directors
comprising the President, Deputy President, five Directors and an Auditor.
The normal term of office for directors is three years with directors being
eligible for reelection. The President, Mr. Jin Wook Chung, has spent most
of his career at CNB and was appointed President in May 1979. The Deputy
President, Mr. Chul Soon Yun and the five directors have, collectively, many
years' experience, mainly in CNB (see Annex 6). Each director is respon-
sible for at least three of CNB's 20 departments (see Organization Chart,
Annex 7). CNB has an experienced and professional body of managers and deputy
managers in its departments and branch offices. Each branch manager,
department manager, director and the deputy president has an authorized
ceiling below which he can approve loans; loans above the ceiling are referred
to a higher level, with large loans ultimately being approved by the
President.
4.05 CNB's major deposit-taking and lending operations are handled
through a wide network of branches (divided into main branches, subbranches
and deposit offices), with Seoul head office departments responsible mainly
for staff activities, such as research, personnel, planning and overall
policy, and operating guidelines and supervision of the branches. At Sept-
ember 30, 1979, CNB had 163 branches spread throughout Korea (see Map); of
these 81 were in Seoul metropolitan area. Current plans call for an increase
to 188 branches by the end of 1981. Due to the size of Busan, a special
office called the "Busan Area Activity Promotion Department" supervises and
coordinates the activities of the 8 branches in Gyungsang Nam Do as well as
/1 CNB's paid-in share capital was increased to W 30 billion as of
December 31, 1979.
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the 16 branches in the Busan metropolitan area. No similar arrangement is
necessary for Seoul, because the Head Office is in a position to exercise
daily supervision of the Seoul branches.
Organization for Term Lending
4.06 The International Department was set up in October 1978 to handle
foreign currency borrowing and lending and is the department responsible for
the proposed loan. While the International Department will be responsible
for the lending of foreign exchange funds, term lending in domestic currency
will still remain under the Loan Administration Department. This will mean
that the term lending will come under the supervision of two directors.
This is unlikely to cause problems in the short term, given the relatively
small size of the foreign exchange operations. However, as these operations
grow, and as it becomes more necessary to combine domestic and foreign
currencies as part of single loan packages, increasing problems of coordina-
tion will arise in loan processing. CNB should, therefore, try to find ways
to coordinate its lending. A logical step would be the formation of a loan
committee with the participation of responsible departments to review
together the term loans from the respective departments. Such a committee
will enable CNB to maintain uniform criteria in its term lending operations
and a bank-wide improvement of project appraisal skills can be achieved.
CNB's management is actively considering this idea. As a first step to
strengthen the coordination between different departments, the International
Department is asked to conduct a preliminary review of all domestic currency
term loan applications and its recommendations will be taken into account
by the Loan Administration Department.
Staff
4.07 CNB's total staff numbered 6,424 at September 30, 1979 (Annex 8).
Of these, 1,340 were classified as professional staff, including 300 financial
analysts/accountants, 186 economists/market analysts, 204 lawyers, 7 engineers
and 643 general bankers (classified mainly by educational background). Of the
total staff, 5,490 or 85%, were in the branches, reflecting their role in
collecting deposits and making loans. Total staff requirements are expected
to increase at around 8% per year over the next few years, as CNB's operations
continue to grow. Staff are usually recruited directly from high school and
university, and staff members tend to see CNB as a long-term career source of
employment. Staff turnover is consequently low with the professional staff
turnover varying between 3.9% and 5.9% during 1975-78. Salary levels at CNB
are the same as at other Government-owned banks. Promotion is based on an
efficiency rating system derived from seniority, supervisors' annual assess-
ments, and achievements in training seminars.
4.08 The International Department had 41 staff members at November 30,
1979 (Annex 9). Of these, 20 were professionals with training in financial
analysis, business administration and economics. Twelve of these staff will
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be involved in the processing of long-term foreign exchange loans, including
the proposed Bank Loan, with the rest handling the ordinary foreign exchange
services. These staff will be supplemented by 9 engineers recruited in early
1979 by CNB into the Credit Analysis Department. These enginetrs all have
substantial working experience and held senior engineering positions in
Government and private industry prior to being recruited by CNB. The staff
involved in foreign currency lending is of adequate size and qualifications to
handle the expected volume of foreign currency lending operations in the near
term. CNB intends to further expand the staff of the International Department
and relevant staff involved in term lending, as necessary to cope with the
future workload. The International Department has high prestige in CNB and
the management was able to to select from the best available candidates. CNB
has worked out a comprehensive training program for 1980 addressed to training
the new staff and upgrading the capabilities of the existing one (para. 4.09).
Training
4.09 CNB's Training Department is responsible for co-ordinating a large
number of training programs. These programs include in-house training and
external courses, mainly through the Bankers Association of Korea. In
addition, senior staff members attend courses overseas. In 1978, 2,706 staff
members attended 43 in-house courses, 726 attended 106 external courses, and
27 staff members went overseas for periods ranging from 1 to 12 months.
4.10 Because of CNB's primary-functions, its staff training has
traditionally been oriented towards commercial banking operations and organi-
zational development within CNB. However, the movement into long-term
foreign exchange lending has brought about a need for increased expertise in
development banking, including project promotion, appraisal and supervision.
To fill this need, CNB has developed a comprehensive training program, in
association with the KDB and SMIB. Senior officers of KDB and SMIB gave a
two-month training course in March/April 1979 to all CNB staff involved in
foreign exchange financing. This course encompassed one month of classroom
instruction on lending procedures, project appraisal and supervision, and
procurement, following by one month of case studies taken from projects
previously financed by SMIB. While this comprehensive training has prepared
continue its efforts both to train the new staff needed as foreign exchange
lending increases, and to acquaint more fully other staff members (in the
head office and branches) involved in term lending with appropriate loan
processing techniques. Realizing this need, CNB has worked out a compre-
hensive training program for 1980. Under this program, a higher priority has
been assigned to the training of the staff of the International Department
and those involved in domestic currency term-loan operations. In order to
upgrade the staff's expertise in project appraisal and supervision, a selected
number of them will be sent to the Korean Banking Training Institute, the
Korea Correspondence College and graduate schools for further training. About
30 staff members are scheduled to be trained overseas in dealing with inter-
national banking business, which includes foreign exchange operations, project
the staff to handle long-term project financing, CNB will still need to
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appraisal and supervision, and procurement procedures. CNB also plans,
wherever possible, to send senior staff to attend conferences and seminars to
broaden their knowledge of the development banking operations.
Operating Policies and Development Strategy
4.11 CNB has drawn up a Policy Statement to supplement the broad policy
and operational guidelines of the CNB Act (Annex 10). It outlines the major
policy measures through which CNB intends to assist the development of small
industry in Korea. It states that CNB will assist small industry through
financial and managerial assistance, with broad priority being given to
exporting industries, industries with high employment potential, and those
helping to develop technical expertise and product innovation. The policy
statement further outlines CNB's general operating procedures, financial
exposure limits and provisions for doubtful loans. The financial guidelines
do not specify a statutory limit on CNB's long-term debt/equity ratio, but a
limit of 7:1 has been agreed with ADB and the Bank agrees with this limit.
4.12 To further emphasize its immediate and specific development objec-
tives, CNB envisages adopting a Development Strategy for the next two years,
1980-81, which outlines specific areas on which CNB intends to place greater
emphasis. CNB will make special efforts to assist small and export-oriented
projects and those located in provincial areas, to raise long-term resources,
to strengthen its research capability and to intensify training of its staff
to cope with its expanded operations.
Prolect Appraisal and Supervision
4.13 CNB's appraisal of its existing domestic currency loans is commer-
cially oriented and relies heavily on1 the credit standing of the borrower and
on collateral security. For the foreign currency term loans financed
through the International Department, however, a comprehensive appraisal
based on a project analysis has been introduced. The financial, managerial,
marketing, and economic aspects of appraisal are carried out by International
Department staff, while the technical analysis is undertaken by engineers
from the Credit Analysis Department. Both Departments are under the super-
The staff concerned have been well-trained and have a good understanding of
the steps involved in project appraisal. During the initial period, all
project appraisal for foreign currency loans will be carried out by the
International Department, with branches simply forwarding loan applications.
However, as appraisal skills develop, CNB plans to delegate some project
appraisal to the branches. These plans will be kept under review by future
Bank missions. CNB will prepare full appraisal reports, similar to those
prepared by SMIB, for projects above the free limit, and shorter reports for
smaller projects. These shorter reports will be based on the Bank's
subproject data reporting system. To obtain an adequate picture of the
economic impact of CNB's subloans, CNB has agreed to calculate economic
rates of return for all subloans above the free limit. In addition the
vision of Director Sang Chan Kim, which will minimize coordination problems.
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basic economic and sectoral work underlying the project appraisal needs to
be strengthened through increasing the economic staff of the Research
Department and through more in-depth industry studies carried out by CNB.
4.14 Follow-up of domestic currency loans is currently delegated
entirely to branch offices. The branches monitor projects by telephone,
mail and plant visits. The good quality of CNB's portfolio reflects the
effectiveness of the follow-up work. Supervision of foreign currency loans
will, at least initially, be handled mainly by the International Department,
with the branches involved only as necessary. The Department plans to collect
monthly reports from project sponsors and make regular follow-up visits,
normally every six months, to projects to monitor progress. As the amount of
foreign lending grows over the next 2 to 3 years, some supervision work may be
delegated to the branches.
Procurement and Disbursement
4.15 CNB has prepared a procurement manual outlining its proposed
procedures. Procurement will normally be based on competitive bidding with
contracts awarded to the lowest priced responsive bid. The procedures for
advertising, bidding and contract award are satisfactory. A separate division
has been set up in the International Department to handle procurement.
Disbursement of the Bank Loan would be made under approved subprojects at the
rate of 100% for directly imported equipment or 60% for the cost of locally
procured equipment, representing the estimated foreign exchange component.
B. RESOURCE MOBILIZATION. OPERATIONS AND
DEVELOPMENTAL IMPACT
CNB's Role in Financing SSIs
4.16 In Korea, there are four specialized financial institutions, namely,
KDB, KDFC, SMIB and CNB, which provide development financing assistance to
the industrial sector. KDB and KDFC concentrate on financing relatively large
firms while SMIB and CNB deal with smaller ones. SMIB finances small- and
medium-sized firms either with total assets not exceeding W 500 million or
employing less than 300 workers./l CNB is restricted to enterprises with less
A1 500 workers for selected industries, including automobile parts, elec-
tronic apparatus and its parts, photographic goods, pottery and china,
toys and transport services.
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than 100 employees,/l but there is no separate asset limitation. While
SMIB's total commitments in any one single enterprise in whatever form will
normally not exceed 25% of its equity,/2 CNB's domestic currency lending to
single enterprise should not exceed the following maximum limits: W 30
million for equipment loans, W 40 million for working capital loans and W 30
million for guarantees. It is clear that there is some duplication between
SMIB and CNB in the provision of finance for SSI but it is partially offset
by the counteracting conditions and practices which tend to separate the
clientele of the two institutions. These include the 'one-bank' tradition
among Korean borrowers (in part due to collateral arrangements), the branch
locations of the two institutions and the fact that CNB's borrowers are in
most cases its depositors under various deposit schemes, especially the
Mutual Installment Savings and Remuneration Scheme. Moreover, the demand
for finance by SSIs has been hitherto much higher than supply. As long as
this situation continues, as is likely for some time, the operations of
these two institutions will probably continue to be largely complementary.
4.17 CNB's lending operations have grown rapidly and its total outstan-
ding loan portfolio reached W 434.0 billion at end-1978,/3 which accounted
for 4.3% of all short- and long-term credit outstanding from the commercial
banking system (all deposit money banks) and the development banks (Annex
3). At the same time, CNB's outstanding equipment loans of W 32.3 billion
amounted to 2.4% of all equipment loans from the commercial banking system.
Its equipment loan disbursements reached W 17.3 billion in 1977, which was
about 12% of total SSI fixed asset formation for that year. In 1978, while
the level of disbursements remained almost the same as in 1977, the per-
centage dropped to around 7% given the sharp increase in the SSI fixed asset
formation in 1978.
Resource Mobilization
4.18 CNB has relied almost exclusively on its deposits in financing its
lending operations. Apart from ordinary demand and savings deposits, CNB
/1 CNB's lending is restricted to small-scale manufacturing, mining and
transportation enterprises employing 5 to 100 workers and construction
and service enterprises employing 5 to 20 workers. CNB is allowed to
lend to enterprises employing more than 100 workers, if the loan amount
is limited to W 10 million. (In the first nine months of 1979, 2.5% of
CNB's equipment loan approvals went to such enterprises.)
/2 As of the end of 1978, SMIB's equity reached W 25.8 billion. Twenty-five
percent of its equity amounted to W 6.5 billion. This compared with total
CNB's exposure in one enterprise of W 100 million.
/3 By September 30, 1979, CNB's total loan portfolio reached W 523.0 bil-
lion.
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offers a variety of deposit schemes (for a sample, see Annex 4) differentiated
by depositor, purpose, and maturities, and by September 30, 1979 it had mobil-
ized deposits totaling W 1,010 billion. The most important deposit scheme is
the Mutual Installment Savings and Remuneration Scheme under ...ich CNB and
the depositor enter into a contract when the first deposit is made. The
depositor undertakes to deposit a fixed amount each month for a specified
period (15-60 months). In return, CNB agrees to make a loan (called "remu-
neration") after 1/5 of the contract period is completed and deposits made
as contracted. The loan and deposit amounts are so calculated as to be
equal, after inclusion of interest on both sides, at the end of the contract
period, when the deposits and the loan are simultaneously liquidated. CNB
has the exclusive authority to operate this Scheme in Korea. It also handles
Property Formation Deposits to facilitate the purchase of houses by wage
earners. Under this Scheme, which started in 1976, wage earners are permit-
ted to deposit up to 30% of their monthly salary in the deposit account,
earning a rate of interest up to 27% p.a. CNB receives a subsidy of 9% from
the Government and itself pays the remaining 18% to the depositor under the
Scheme. CNB is obligated to make a housing loan twice the amount of total
deposits under this Scheme. Using its widespread branch network, CNB is
able to mobilize savings from small savers, including both individuals and
enterprises, very effectively.
4.19 Compared with other development banks in Korea, CNB has relatively
limited access to government funds, particularly to long-term domestic
currency resources. (CNB has served as an on-lending agent for such govern-
ment funds as Industrial Rationalization Fund (IRF) and funds for financing
war veterans but the amounts are small, W 1.3 billion at September 30, 1979).
In view of CNB's role in financing SSI, the Government should allow CNB to
have access to the newly established SMI Promotion Fund (an amount of W 15.7
billion has been allocated for this Fund for 1979 and an additional W 16.5
billion for 1980). The appraisal mission has discussed this matter with both
the Government and CNB. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry agreed to the
proposal that CNB be given access to the funds provided under the SMI
Promotion Fund (to which, to date, only SMIB has had access). In March 1980
CNB will be designated as a handling intermediary for the SMI Promotion Fund
and an agreement for the management of part of the funds will be executed
between CNB and SMIPC. The funds have a maximum maturity of 10 years and
the onlending rate is 23.5%.
4.20 CNB's continuing resource mobilization efforts and the credit ceil-
ings imposed by MOF (in consultation with BOK) resulted in a large surplus of
liquid funds which are being kept as cash in banks, invested in securities
or onlent in the form of deposits with other banks and via the call money
market. At September 30, 1979, a total amount of W 364 billion remained in
such liquid or semiliquid form, yielding an average interest rate of 13.2%
p.a. compared with its average lending rate of around 18.5%. Since CNB's
principal role is to assist SSI, channelling of such liquid funds through
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the commercial banking system and the call money market, which would in most
cases be benefitting large-scale industries, does not appear to be in line
with the institution's objectives and, therefore, the credit policy applic-
able to CNB deserves constant review by the Government. CNB, on its part,
is focusing more attention on its resource allocation, seeking ways to
reduce the level of its liquid funds. As a departure from its past policy,
CNB has decided to make 10-year term loans (so far it only confined to 5-
year loans) and an initial amount of W 2 billion has been earmarked by its
Board for this purpose for 1980.
Summary of CNB's Lending Operations
4.21 CNB's lending operations are summarized in Annex 12. At end-1978,
CNB had a total outstanding loan portfolio of W 434.0 billion, more than
double the 1975 level of W 191.9 billion. (By end-September 1979, it stood
at W 523.0 billion.) Playing an important role as a popular savings bank,
CNB's operations have primarily emphasized resource mobilization, offering a
wide variety of deposit schemes to savers. On the lending side, CNB provides
three types of financial assistance (in domestic currency): 'general popu-
lace' (consumer) loans, short- and medium-term working capital loans and
medium-term equipment loans to small industries. CNB is authorized by its
Act to extend equipment loans to a maximum of W 30 million, working capital
loans to a maximum of W 40 million and guarantees up to W 30 million. The
Government is presently considering CNB's request to increase the limit on.
equipment loans from W 30 million to W 100 million. CNB started in 1979 to
provide long-term equipment loans in foreign currency against its resources
obtained from ADB. During the four-year period from 1975 to 1978, CNB's
overall loan approvals increased from W 123.0 billion to W 340.5 billion,
showing an average annual growth of 22.6%. However, for industry loans
(including working capital and equipment loans), a decline of 9% was regis-
tered in 1978 after growth at an average annual rate of 27.6% in 1975-77.
The consumer loan approvals increased at an annual rate of 26.6% in 1975-77
and rose sharply, by 57.6%, in 1978. This stemmed from the fact that the
Government started in 1978 to impose credit ceilings on financial institu-
tions and CNB was unable to maintain a proper balance between industry lend-
ing and consumer lending because of the compulsory nature of the Mutual
Installment Savings and Remuneration Scheme. The industry loan and general
populace loan approvals increased, on an annual basis, 19.5% and 18.8%
respectively in the first nine months of 1979.
4.22 Equipment Loans. CNB's cumulative equipment loan approvals over
the period January 1975-September 1979 amounted to W 57.5 billion. Approvals
increased consistently until 1977. In 1978 equipment loan approvals
actually declined by 1.4% to W 17.1 billion (from W 17.3 billion in 1977)
mainly because of the impact of credit ceilings imposed by MOF starting in
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August 1978.11 Equipment loans have accounted only for an average of 5.2%
of total annual approvals over the period. The number of equipment loan
approvals increased from 3,903 in 1975 to 5,257 in 1978, and their average
size incread from W 2.02 million in 1975 to W 3.25 million in 1978. In the
first nine months of 1979, the average size registered further increases to W
3.98 million. At September 30, 1979, 79.1% of CNBs outstanding equipment
loans were made under the Mutual Installment Savings and Remuneration Scheme.
The Scheme is attractive because it enables the borrower to secure medium-term
Cup to five years) loans at low interest rates and because it provides CNB
with a steady flow of deposits which have been 'contracted' and can therefore
be predicted with reasonable accuracy. On the other hand, by virtue of its
contractual features which in effect give the depositor the right to borrow,
it does not leave CNB with much, if any, flexibility in making independent
allocative decisions. Apart from the loans extended under this Scheme, NB
also makes some equipment loans (up to five years maturity) on a more usual
basis outside the Scheme, based on project and collateral appraisal. These
loans accounted for 21.1% of outstanding equipment loans at September 30,
1979.
4.23 Working Capital Loans. These accounted for 44.9% of total loan
approvaLs in the first nine months of 1979, compared with 59.7% in 1975. At
September 30, 1979, outstanding working capital loans amounted to W 257.7
billion which represented 49.3% of the total portfolio. 68.8% of the out-
standing working capital loans belong to the Mutal Installment Savings and
Remuneration Scheme. The amount of working capital loan approvals declined by
10% in 1978 but the trend was reversed in the first nine months of 1979.
Short-term working capital loans are evaluated on a collateral basis.
4.24 General Populace (Consumer) Loans. By number, consumer loans
accounted for the overwhelming bulk of total approvals (82.6% in 1978 and 85%
in the first nine months of 1979). However, by amount, consumer loans
represented only 50% of total approvals in the same periods. The growth in
approvals has been rapid, particularly in 1978 which registered an increase of
57.6% over the 1977 level. The upward trend continued in the first nine
months of 1979 registering an increase of 19% on an annual basis. This was
achieved at the expense of loan approvals for small industry working capital
and equipment loans. As of the end of September 1979, 68.1% of the general
populace loans were under the Mutual Installment Savings and Remuneration
Scheme.
Characteristics of CNB's Ecuipment Loans
4.25 The characteristics of CNB's equipment loan approvals for 1975-78
and the first nine months of 1979 are summarized in Annex 13.
/1 These are stipulated quarterly and apply to the operations of the institu-
tion as a whole (i.e., not specified per loan activity). They are regu-
larly revised on the basis of incremental deposits received by CNB during
the previous quarter.
- 36 -
4.26 Sectoral Distribution. The most notable feature of CNB's sectoral
allocation is its remarkable stability from 1975 to 1978. The manufacturing
sector accounted for the bulk of its equipment loan approvals, increasing
slightly from 68.7% in 1975 to 72.9% in 1978. But this pattern was changing
in the first nine months of 1979 when the share of the manufacturing sector
dropped to 48.4%. This is mainly attributable to the fact that a number of
loans were made to finance projects in the transportation sector, increasing
its share from an average of 8.6% during 1975-78, to 27.2% in the first nine
months of 1979. CNB has no explicit policy on its exposure in individual
industries. Textiles took up 21.4% of total approvals in 1978, followed by
machinery (11.5%), chemicals (10.3%) and wood products (10.2%). The corres-
ponding percentages dropped to 14.7%, 7.7%, 5.2% and 3.7%, respectively in
the first nine months of 1979.
4.27 Geographical Distribution. The geographical pattern has been very
stable over the years 1975-78. Its actual distribution remained highly skewed
in favor of Seoul, which accounted for 56.9% of total approvals in 1978, with
Busan City absorbing a further 7.6%. The combined urban areas of Seoul and
Busan accounted for 64.5% of equipment loan approvals in 1978, which propor-
tion decreased slightly to 62.1% in the first nine months of 1979. The recent
trend of CNB's operations is therefore not towards greater geographical
dispersal. Government policy has, however, encouraged a more even spread of
industrial activity for all enterprise size groups, including SSIs which have
enjoyed preferential treatment under the Saemaeul Movement and by the
establishment of several specialized industrial estates. CNB is prepared to
move toward more geographical dispersal, as emphasized in its Development
Strategy for 1980-81 (Annex 11).
4.28 Loan Size Distribution. Due to price inflation and changes in
Korea's industrial structure, the average size of CNB's equipment loans has
increased substantially (Annex 13). In 1975-77, 66.0% of the loans approved
were below W 5 million but this declined to 43.5% in 1978 and the first nine
first nine months of 1979. Conversely, there were no loan approval in the
W 20-30 million range in 1975-76 and only 6.8% in 1977, while this category
accounted for 13.1% of the total during the period January 1978 to September
30, 1979. The average size of equipment loan approvals went up from W 2.02
million in 1975 to W 3.25 million in 1978, and to W 3.98 million in the first
nine months of 1979.
4.29 Duration of Loans. The maturity of equipment loans approved by CNB
has shortened between 1975 and September 30, 1979 (Annex 13). Loans below
three years increased from 57.0% to 70.0% over that period, while maturities
of three-to-five years declined from 43.0% of total approvals to 30.0%. This
is attributable to the fact that in the earlier years CNB made loans of longer
maturities under a special government fund and term loans under the Mutual
Installment Scheme were usually of shorter duration because of the contractual
waiting period. CNB was unable to make loans having maturities longer than
five years because of lack of long-term resources.
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4.30 Subborrower Employee Size. The most prominent feature of CNB's
equipment loan clientele is the large proportion of very small firms.
Enterprises with only 5-20 employees received 70.0%-83.1% of CNB's equipment
loans in 1975-78 and 58.5% in the first nine months of 1979. Tho firms
employing 50-100 workers have received only 7.0% of CNB's equipment loans
since 1975.
4.31 Other Features. The total asset size of CNB's equipment loan
borrowers (at the application stage) averaged W 208 million /1 with a substan-
tial proportion below W 150 million. Only about 12% (by number) of CNB's
clients exceeded the W 500 million total asset size, specified as one of two
alternative definitions of SMIs. Around 20% (by number) of CNB's equipment
loans went to limited liability companies in 1978, the other borrowers being
single-ownership private enterprises. By type of project, CNB allocated its
equipment loans mostly to expansion projects in 1978, accounting for 70% of
total loan amount and 72% by number. New projects received 27% (by amount),
the remainder going to replacement projects.
4.32 Economic Analysis. CNB has hitherto monitored only partial economic
indicators; ERRs (and FRRs) have not been calculated in the past. A sample
survey of such partial indicators covering 87 projects before July 1979 is
presented in Annex 14. There are a few features worth noting. The propor-
tion of total project cost financed by CNB is fairly low, averaging 35.2%.
This is due partly to the general inadequacy of collaterals of CNB's clients
and partly to the low ceilings on CNB's maximum equipment loan size. As
regards employment creation, the performance of CNB-financed subprojects has
been satisfactory. These projects created 806 new jobs of which 247 or 31%
were taken by skilled workers. The average investment cost per incremental
job was W 3.8 million (US$7,835) which indicates that CNB has emphasized
relatively labor-intensive subprojects.
4.33 CNB's economic evaluation of projects would be greatly strengthened
if it included a calculation of ERR's. During negotiations, agreement has
been reached that CNB will calculate ERR's for subprojects above the free
limit to be financed under the proposed loan.
4.34 ForeiRn Currency Subloans. The average employee size of applicants
for foreign currency term loans under the ADB loan of $10 million to CNB is
44 workers. This is higher than the average for domestic currency equipment
loans. The pipeline of projects to be financed by the ADB loan shows that an
amount of US$6.3 million (out of US$10 million) may go to clients with less
than 50 employees. The average total asset size is W 329 million, with 12
(out of 50) enterprises being larger than the SMI limit of W 500 million total
asset size. The average loan size is US$199,300, with 14 (out of 50) enter-
prises provisionally receiving US$300,000, which is the ceiling on subloan
/1 Based on a review of the applications approved during 1978.
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size agreed between CNB and ADB. On balance, while the data are preliminary
and limited, it seems that the foreign currency loans are going to slightly
larger SSIs than are the domestic currency equipment loans.
Other Activities
4.35 Extension Services. Under the SMI Promotion Act, CNB was authorized
as one of several institutions to provide extension services to its clients.
The assistance hitherto extended by CNB has been carried out mainly at the
branch level and is usually provided in connection with a loan application.
It has focussed principally on managerial, administrative and bookkeeping
matters. This assistance serves to simultaneously improve the business
prospects for CNB's clients and therefore also the quality of CNB's portfolio.
For 1980, CNB has submitted a plan to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
outlining the extension services (including managerial counseling and
technical assistance) to be rendered to about 100 small enterprises, includ-
ing all borrowers of CNB's foreign currency subloans. This plan is satis-
factory to MCI. At the latter's suggestion, CNB will work closely with both
SMIB and SMIPC in providing technical assistance to the small firms.
4.36 Promotion Activity. CNB's promotion work is being expanded. It has
regularly conducted (in 1970, 1971, 1973 and 1977) a very comprehensive small
industry survey which forms part of EPB's National Wealth Survey. This will
be continued. CNB also monitors economic developments in the SSI sector.
More recently, the Credit Analysis Department of CNB has focussed on active
project promotion by undertaking specific industry studies. Their principal
objective is to analyze the credit status and trends of enterprises in
selected industries in order to generate useful information for CNB's lending
operations. This activity should be further strengthened particularly by
including engineers in the survey staff. CNB should make full use of its
extensive branch network in identifying and developing projects in collabora-
tion with small entrepreneurs scattered in various provinces. In conjunction
with its promotion work, CNB has specified a number of lending priorities
which currently include export-oriented and subcontracting enterprises. This
is in accordance with Government policy.
4.37 Guarantees. CNB provides security guarantees as an agent for the
KCGF. It is empowered to issue guarantees, up to a limit of W 20 million,/l
beyond which guarantees are subject to prior approval of the KCGF. Credit
analysis is undertaken in accordance with KCGF guidelines which are detailed
and cover financial, economic and managerial aspects. This type of analysis
helps promote a cash-flow business prospects approach to loan evaluation, as
opposed to a purely collateral approach. At end-September 1979, CNB had made
loans amounting to W 34.9 billion which were covered by credit guarantees.
/1 There are several exceptions to this "free limit," for example, W 100
million for defense or export industries, cooperatives, etc.
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This accounted for 6.7% of the total outstanding portfolio as of that date.
For working capital loans, this was as high as 12.8%, and for equipment
loans 7.1%, while for consumer loans it was zero./l CNB can also issue
guarantees fo its clients who take loans from other banks.
4.38 Equity Investments. CNB's equity investments are summarized in
Annex 15. Legally CNB is not authorized to make equity investments in its
clients in accordance with its Act (Article 18). It has, however, made a
few small investments in nonclient companies at the suggestion of MOF./2
At end-September 1979, CNB held investments in 14 companies at an original
cost of W 2.05 billion. Dividends received in 1978 were low (W 7.1 million)
representing an average yield of 0.35%. All CNB's investments represented
small minority shareholdings except for its ownership of the Bukook Mutual
Savings and Finance Company in which CNB has invested W 1.5 billion. In
this case, CNB's involvement (at the suggestion of MOF) was intended as a
rescue attermpt and may be terminated once Bukook is profitable again. All
equity holdings By C'o are considered temporary investments, putting to use
its surplus funds.
C. FINANCIAL POSITION AND PERFORMANCE
Financial Position
4.39 CNB's summarized balance Slheets as of December 31, 1975-78 and
Septe,ibee 30, 1979 are giver i L Mriii 1'.. )Trhig io' )rELl froLY l975 to
1973, CnB's total assets h;ad L-cceas!i nore then I:heeeFold, From W 263.6
billioa (WI3$543 nitlion) as of lecesher 31, 1975 to W 868.8 billion
('JS$1,791 million) as of December 31, 1978, showing an average annual growth
of about 49%. In the first nine months of 1979 a further growth of 28% was
registered, bringing the total assets figure to W 1,113.4 billion equivalent
to US$2,295 million. This impressive growth was entirely attributable to
the sharp rise in deposits. The growth of short-term deposits was slightly
higher than that of medium/long-term deposits. This clearly indicates that
CNB's efforts in mobilizing resources from small savers have been very
successful. However, CNB's loan portfolio did not show the same growth
/1 For total loans outstanding, 80.1% was secured by collateral, 7.3% by
credit guarantees and 12.6% was unsecured.
/2 As part of MOF's monetary policy operations, CNB has, like other
financial institutions, also invested in Monetary Stabilization Bonds
(to an amount of W 55 billion outstanding at end-September 1979).
This is not, of course, an equity investment.
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pattern. Its short- and long-term loans combined increased at a much lower
rate, around 31% a year during 1975-78. (At December 31, 1975, CNB's total
loan portfolio accounted for 73% of its total assets. By the end of 1978,
this ratio had dropped to 50%). Its lending operations have been affected
by the credit ceilings imposed by MOF (in consultation with BOK) in August
1978, with subsequent adjustments. The slow growth of its loan portfolio
relative to its total assets, also reflects the fact that CNB's resource
allocation was not as aggressive as its resource mobilization. As a result,
CNB has remained very liquid, with its sizeable liquid funds lent to other
domestic banks, or in the form of call loans, or invested in securities. As
of December 31, 1978, such liquid funds, including cash, reached W 327.2
billion, equivalent to 75% of its total loan portfolio. As of September 30,
1979, such liquid funds were W 424.5 billion and the ratio went up to 81%.
4.40 CNB has been operating on a very thin equity, which accounted for
1.3% of total liabilities and equity at the end of 1978, showing a debt/
equity relationship of 77:1 (40:1 as of September 30, 1979). The long-term
debt/equity ratio (after excluding current maturities of long-term debt)
reached 24:1 (9:1 as of September 30, 1979). After adjustments by excluding
current maturities of long-term debt, BOK's reserve requirement and
remunerated installment savings, the long-term debt/equity ratio amounted to
14:1 (5.1 as of September 30, 1979). A long-term debt/equity ratio of 7:1
with the above adjustments has been agreed upon between CNB and ADB, which is
also acceptable to the Bank. As of December 31, 1979, CNB has increased its
paid-in share capital from W 5 billion to W 30 billion by the end of 1979./i
After this increase, CNB's long-term debt/equity ratio (adjusted) is
expected to fall within the range of 5.2:1 to 6.1:1 in the following four
years, 1980-83.
4.41 Taking into account all the current maturities of its loans and
long-term debt, CNB's current ratio has risen from 1.02 in 1975 to 1.19 in
1978 and again declined to 1.10 as of September 30,1979. Since a substantial
portion of its short-term debt can be counted on to be rolled over, CNB's
liquidity position was satisfactory. CNB has agreed with ADB to maintain
a current ratio of 1.1:1, which would be acceptable to the Bank. Since CNB
has been using a portion of its short-term resources to finance long-term
loans, CNB is prepared to adopt appropriate measures to correct any resulting
imbalances. It was agreed between CNB and ADB that CNB shall keep the
maturities of its deposits (and borrowings) and lendings reasonably matched
and the Government has agreed to provide long-term funds to CNB if there
should be a serious imbalance between the two in the future.
/1 The authorized capital is at present W 30 billion. The net increase in
paid-in share capital consisted of W 11.2 billion in cash and W 13.8
billion by way of assets revaluation.
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Financial Performance
4.42 Annexes 17 and 18 present CNB's summarized income statements and
cash flow statements for the period 1975-78 and the first nine onths of
1979. In 1978, CNB's gross income reached W 98.7 billion (W 109.3 billion for
the first nine months of 1979), of which 91.5% was derived from interest on
all loans. Gross income has increased at an average rate of 46% since 1975,
which is satisfactory. CNB's net income stood at W 2,106 million
(US$4.3 million) in 1978, which was more than double that of 1977 (W 1,014
million). In the first nine months of 1979, its net income reached W 2,274
million. In the first nine months of 1979, its net income reached W 2,274
million. CNB's profitability has been very low, with its net profit as a
percentage of average total assets hovering within the range between 0.2% and
0.3% during 1975-78. Its return on average equity was more satisfactory.
Given its thin equity base, its return increased from around 5% in 1975 to
around 20% in 1978 (12% for the first nine months of 1979).
4.43 CNB's low profitability was mainly attributable to its low spread
and its high administrative costs. Its spread on "deposits" with other
domestic banks has been very low, but such deposits continued to increase.
In 1975, such deposits amounted to W 9.7 billion. In 1977-79, the average
year-end level reached W 114 billion. In this respect (and via call money
operations), CNB acted as a mobilizer of savings which it distributed to
various banks which were short of resources. During the process of such
resource allocation, CNB was not able to improve its profitability. On the
contrary, such operations have contributed to the erosion of its profits
gained from normal lending.
4.44 CNB's administrative costs in 1975 accounted for 4.6% of its average
total assets. This ratio dropped to a range of 3.6-3.8% in 1976-78, which was
much higher than other banks. CNB's extensive branch network and the high
overhead costs associated with handling numerous deposit and loan accounts
sufficiently explain this situation. Unless CNB's spread is adequately
increased across the board, it would be unrealistic to expect CNB to increase
its profitability.
4.45 The appropriation of CNB's net profits is subject to the prior
approval of MOF. In compliance with its Act, CNB has set aside 25% of its
net profit as legal reserves. CNB has paid dividends at 7 to 8% during
1975-78. The remainder of its net profits was accumulated as other re-
serves. Total reserves of CNB as of December 31, 1978 reached W 6,076 mil-
lion, corresponding to 1.2 times its paid-in share capital.
Quality of Portfolio
4.46 As of September 30, 1979, CNB's total loan portfolio reached W
522,989 million (US$1,078 millon) consisting of the following types of
loans.
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W million %
Business Loans
Equipment loans 36,040 6.9
Short-term working capital loans 46,453 8.9
Long-term working capital loans 211,292 40.4
Subtotal 293.785 56.2
General Populace Loans
Short-term loans 32,965 6.3
Long-term loans 196,239 37.5
Subtotal 229,204 43.8
Total 522.989 100.0
During the period 1975-78, general populace loans had increased at a higher
rate than business loans. At the end of 1975, general populace loans
accounted for 32% of CNB's entire loan portfolio. This ratio had increased
to 45% at the end of 1978 and became 44% at September 30, 1979. Given
that CNB has been successful in mobilizing resources from small savers and
that it has initiated the mutual installment savings and remuneration and
property formation savings schemes, a more rapid expansion of its loans to
general populace was a natural development, since depositors were inclined
to exercise their options of obtaining loans from CNB.
4.47 The level of arrears on CNB's loans has been low during the past
years. At the end of 1975, total arrears accounted for 2.1% of total loans
outstanding and loans affected by arrears accounted for 19% of total loans
outstanding (Annex 19). These ratios dropped to 1-1.2% and 11-14%
respectively during the following three years (1976-78). As of
September 30, 1979, arrears/loans ratio dropped further to 0.9%, although a
higher percentage (15%) of loans were affected by such arrears. CNB's loan
collection ratio averaged about 98% during the period 1975-78, and its loan
reschedulings as a percentage of average loan portfolio remained at a low
level (1.5%-2.2%) in 1975-77 and went up to 4.2% in 1978. For the first
nine months of 1979, the ratio went down to 3.7%. The Government's tight
credit policies in 1978 and 1979 have indirectly contributed to liquidity
difficulties faced by industries, thus increasing their requests for loan
rescheduling.
4.48 Loans written off in 1975-78 averaged W 16 million which was
infinitesimal compared with the size of CNB's loan portfolio. This is
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explainable by the fact that CNB usually requires a collateral coverage of
120% of its loans. Since real estate contributes the major part of the
collaterals, the risk of depreciation in value of the collaterals is
minimal.
Provisions Policy
4.49 The Corporate Tax Code in Korea allows banking institutions to
make provisions for doubtful loans up to 2% of the loans outstanding./1 Such
provisions are exempted from taxation. However, CNB did not take advantage
of this stipulation. In 1975 and 1976, CNB did not make any provisions for
doubtful loans but simply charged bad debts to its current year's revenue
since CNB felt that it had sufficient provisions accumulated in previous
years. In 1977, the Credit Guarantee Act required CNB to accumulate special
provisions for possible defaults of general livelihood loans at the rate of
0.2% of the total outstanding amount of such loans. Accordingly, CNB set
aside W 192 million in 1977. In 1978, the rate of special provisions was
raised to 0.5%. (Although CNB is required to accumulate special provisions
only on general livelihood loans, it accumulates them on the entire general
populace loans). For overall provisions (called ordinary provisions), since
1978, CNB's policy has been guided by the State Audit Board's "Guidelines
for Settlement of Accounts by Government Invested Institutions". According
to such Guidelines, ordinary provisions for doubtful loans should be made at
a rate equal to the rate of actual write-offs on the total loan portfolio
during the preceding year. In 1978, CNB allocated W 24 million against its
revenue as ordinary provisions and W 710 million as special provisions for
doubtful loans and at the end of 1978 total provisions (ordinary and
special) stood at W 924 million. According to the Audit Board's guidelines,
unutilized ordinary provisions at the end of the year should not be
accumulated and should be returned to revenues. CNB has to adhere to such
guidelines. In view of the collateral coverage of the CNB's loans and the
negligible amounts of actual write-offs in the past, CNB's total provisions
in 1977 and 1978 were adequate. Although CNB's provisions policy on special
provisions appears to be satisfactory, on ordinary provisions it may become
inadequate in future. As CNB starts to make foreign currency loans which
will have maturities longer than five years, CNB should formulate a revised
provisions policy in anticipation of higher write-offs in the future, and
should seek approval of such a policy from the supervisory Government
agencies. CNB's past experience with regard to bad debts is no longer a
useful guide for its future operations. It needs a policy under which
adequate provisions will be made and accumulated for both domestic currency
and foreign currency loans. In the meantime, CNB has agreed with the Bank
to instruct the external auditors to certify the adequacy of the provisions
for doubtful loans based on auditors' review of CNB's portfolio in arrears,
its collateral and its future foreign currency loan operations. Based on
/1 CNB is exempted from paying corporate income tax on its income. How-
ever, it is required to pay defense tax.
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auditors' recommendations, CNB will appropriately revise its provisions
policy in the near future.
Resource Position
4.50 Details of CNB's resource position as of September 30, 1979 are
provided in Annex 20. CNB continued to use a part of its short-term
resources to finance its long-term lending operations. As a result, it has
not been able to make loans having maturities over 5 years even though
adequate demand exists for such loans. At September 30, 1979 its long-term
resource short-fall amounted to W 166,458 million, representing 28% of its
total long-term lending and investments. This ratio compares with 46% in
1975, 41% in 1976, 36% in 1977 and 33% in 1978. As CNB's long-term lending
increased at a much slower pace than its short-term lending (in 1978, the
long-term loans outstanding increased 26% while short-term loans increased
163%), the long-term resource gap has become narrower.
4.51 In terms of total short-term resources available, this long-term
resource gap accounted for 27%, as of September 30, 1979. This compares
with 72% in 1975, 63% in 1976, 47% in 1977 and 39% in 1978. In other words,
CNB has been using its resources of less than one year maturity to finance its
loans and investments with maturities ranging from two to five years. Given a
stable deposit base, with numerous depositors, CNB is not vulnerable to wide
gyrations of withdrawals. The present 27% may be considered to fall within
prudent limits applicable to CNB's resource utilization. However, this matter
should be subject to constant review by the management of CNB and the
Government and necessary measures should be taken to avoid any imbalances.
4.52 The overall resource surplus as of September 30, 1979 amounted to
W 236.6 billion, equivalent to US$487.7 million. A fuller utilization of
this sizeable excess liquidity also deserves the management's constant
attention.
Audit
4.53 In line with the practice of the banking institutions in Korea,
CNB has been applying a cash-basis accounting procedure for revenue items
and accrual basis for expenditure items. CNB's accounts are audited by the
State Audit Board (and also subject to examination by the BOK). In accordance
with the agreement reached with ADB concerning auditing of CNB's accounts by
an external independent auditor, CNB has appointed San Kyong and Co. to audit
its accounts and issue an audit report annually starting with its 1979
accounts. This accounting firm had been accepted by the Bank as auditors of
KDB and SMIB. Necessary adjustments will be made by CNB so that its
accounting procedures will fully comply with internationally accepted
accounting standards in the future.
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D. PROSPECTS AND RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
Operational Projections
4.54 In the aftermath of the devaluation which took place in January
1980, the outlook for the Korean economy is expected to remain favorable and
the long-term growth prospects for the manufacturing industries of all sizes
are good. GNP is expected to increase in 1979-81 by 9% annually in real
terms, with the manufacturing sector growing at an annual rate of 14%. The
growth of the economy will continue to be mainly export-led. Export-oriented
industries are expected to expand their capacity for production and the
factories which produce for the domestic market are also expected to modernize
and expand their facilities and increase their output. Exports of goods and
services are projected to increase 17% annually during 1979-81 with
manufactured exports providing the bulk of incremental exports. An annual
increase in gross fixed investment of around 8% is expected during the Fourth
Five Year Plan Period ending 1981. Given the priority assigned to deepening
the structure of Korean industries, the small industries are expected to play
an increasing role. CNB as an institution assisting small industries has
taken that increasing role into account in projecting its operations for the
next five years, 1980-84.
4.55 CNB's loan approvals for 1979 reached W 401.5 billion, equally
distributed between business loans and general populace loans. This compared
with total approvals of W 340.5 billion for 1978 with a similar distribution
pattern. Based on the growth trend of its entire loan portfolio during
1976-79, the annual growth rate of loan approvals after 1980 is assumed to be
around 30% p.a. with business loans increasing at a slightly faster pace than
general populace loans. The projected volume of operations is presented in
Annex 21.
4.56 The time lag between approval and commitment and that between com-
mitment and disbursement of local currency loans has been negligible in the
past and the pattern is expected to remain unchanged in the future. CNB's
foreign currency operations started in the latter part of 1979, and a time lag
between different stages has been taken into account in its projections.
Around 60% of foreign currency loan approvals are expected to be committed in
the current year and 40% in the following year. Around 45% of the commitments
are expected to be disbursed in the current year and 55% in the following
year.
4.57 CNB expects that the actual overall demand for loans would increase
at a higher rate than what it has assumed in making the projections of its own
operations. However, strict Government control on credit expansion is
expected to continue during the projected period. CNB's lending projections
have to be on the conservative side, although CNB's resource mobilization
effort is not expected to taper off.
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4.58 With respect to small industry's demand for foreign exchange
loans, it is estimated to amount to US$80 million in 1979 (compared with
US$65 million in 1978) and US$100 million in 1980, based upon various
surveys conducted by SMIB and CNB. An estimated increase of 25% per year
would not be unrealistic. Therefore, by 1983, the demand would probably reach
US$200 million. CNB, as a new supplier of foreign funds, did not make any
foreign currency disbursements in 1979. However, as CNB mobilizes more
foreign exchange resources in subsequent years, it expects to contribute
around 8% of total demand in 1980 and an average of 17% in 1981-84. This
compares with SMIB's estimated average share of 37% during 1979-83. Since no
other institutions are equipped to provide long-term foreign currency loans to
small industry, this anticipated resource gap would prompt both CNB and SMIB
to raise more foreign currency resources in the next few years.
Resource Requirements
4.59 Local Currency Requirements. CNB's forecast of resource position
and requirements for 1980-84 is shown in Annex 22. During the entire pro-
jection period, CNB is expected to continue to have surplus short-term
resources and to utilize such resources to fill its shortfall in long-term
commitments. By 1980, its long-term resource gap would amount to about W 215
billion representing 41% of its long-term loan commitments; the comparative
ratios for 1981-84 are 43%, 42%, 41% and 41% respectively. While demand for
loans having maturities of more than 5 years is strong, especially as CNB
enters into foreign currency loan operations where many firms are likely to
need domestic currency funds having maturities over 5 years to match their
foreign currency funds, CNB will have to confine itself mainly to making loans
with shorter maturities. CNB has received the Government approval to parti-
cipate in the Small and Medium Industry Promotion Fund; however, this Fund
would provide only limited amount of long-term funds. CNB's short-term
resource surplus each year during the forecast period is estimated to be more
than twice the size of the long-term resource gap, thus enabling CNB to fill
such a gap with resources of less than one year's maturity. The remaining
portion of the surplus short-term resources would be invested in marketable
securities, deposited with those domestic banks that are short of resources,
and lent out as call loans.
4.60 Foreign Currency Requirements. Projected foreign currency commit-
ments during the period 1980-84 total about US$133.1 million (Annex 22).
Apart from the loan of US$10 million which CNB obtained from ADB in the first
part of 1979, CNB plans to raise an additional US$120 million from ADB and
IBRD, and US$3.1 million from the Korean Foreign Exchange Fund during 1980-83.
As of December 31, 1984, CNB is expected to have an uncommitted balance of
US$28.5 million. CNB may find it necessary to make a larger contribution in
meeting the foreign currency resource demand of the small industry sector by
enlarging both its resource mobilization and resource allocation programs in
the projection period.
- 47 -
Projected Financial Results
4.61 Projected income statements and projected indicators of financial
performance for 1979-84 are shown in Annexes 23 and 25. CNB's low profita-
bility is expected to improve in the next few years. The ,..te of growth of
CNB's gross profit will catch up with the rate of growth of its total assets.
However, due to its broad branch network and the costly operations involving
numerous transactions with individuals, households and small industrial
units, CNB's administrative costs as a percentage of its average total assets
would remain high, within the range of 4.1-4.6% during the entire forecast
period 1979-84. Profit before provisions and tax for 1979 is estimated at
W 4.0 billion, representing an increase of 29% from the level reached in 1978
(W 3.1 billion). It is expected to increase to W 8.7 billion in 1980 and to
W 28.3 billion in 1984 representing an average increase of 51% during the
six-year projection period. As a percentage of CNB's average total assets,
profit before provisions and tax was 0.4% in 1978 and will remain unchanged in
1979. It is expected to go up to 0.7% in 1980 and to 0.9 in 1984. CNB's net
profit will not increase in 1979 from the level of W 2.1 billion realized in
1978. It will rise sharply to W 5.9 billion in 1980 and increase to W 19.6
billion by 1984. The expected sharp increase in CNB's profits in 1980 is due
to the increase in its paid-in share capital which took place at the end of
1979 and the fact that share capital costs much less to CNB than deposits.
CNB's return on average equity, after registering a sharp increase from 5% to
20% in 1975-78, is expected to drop to 8.7% in 1979 because of the increase in
share capital mentioned above. The return on average equity will turn upward
to 15.1% in 1980, 17.5% in 1981 and 18.4% in 1984. Such returns would not
rise sharply because of the expected annual increase in share capital during
1981-84.
Projected Financial Position
4.62 Projected balance sheets for 1979-84 are shown in Annex 24, and
selected financial ratios in Annex 25. Based on its operational forecasts,
CNB's total assets are expected to increase from W 868.8 billion as of
December 31, 1978 to W 1,177 billion as of December 31, 1979 and to W 3,583.8
billion as of the end of 1984, showing an average annual rate of growth of
about 27%. Short- and long-term loans are expected to increase from W 434
billion (50% of total assets) in 1978, to W 567.2 billion (48% of total
assets) in 1979 to W 988.5 billion (54% of total assets) in 1981 and to W
2,203.5 billion (62% of total assets) in 1984. While the gradual shifting of
the asset structure in favor of the loan portfolio is a healthy development,
the pace at which this takes place appears to be slow. CNB should take all
possible steps to increase its lending operations to match the pace at which
the resources are mobilized.
4.63 During the forecast period, the increase of CNB's assets will be
financed by additional demand and time depbsits which will increase from
W 796.1 billion at the end of 1978 to W 3,111.0 billion at the end of 1984, an
overall increase of 290%. Total debt will increase from W 849.6 billion in
1978 to W 3,459.8 billion in 1984, while long-term debt will increase from
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W 267.6 billion to W 1,143.7 billion over the same period. During the nego-
tiations, the need to increase CNB's share capital to support the rapidly
rising debt was discussed. CNB's representatives shared the Bank's view that
CNB's equity base needs to be strengthened, and indicated that CNB is prepared
to increase its share capital each year during the period 1981-84. While the
amount of increase is difficult to estimate precisely, because of the
necessity of obtaining the final approval from the National Assembly, CNB will
endeavor to increase W 10 billion each year during 1981-84, at the advice of
the Bank. Assuming that such capital increases will take place, the projected
total debt/equity ratio would drop from the range of 29-33 in 1979-80 to 28-30
in 1981-84. (Without the share capital increases the total debt level would
be 42 times equity by 1984). The projected long-term debt/equity ratio, after
adjustments, remain below 4:1 during the period from 1979-84, compared to the
7.1 limit agreed upon between ADB and CNB and which is also acceptable to the
Bank. The projected current ratio would hover around 1.1:1 during 1979-84,
which is within the limit specified by ADB, and also acceptable to the Bank.
4.64 Projected cash flow statements are given in Annex 26. Since the
pattern of CNB's resource mobilization and resources allocation is assumed
to continue in the future, additional cash surplus is projected each year
during 1980-84. The subject of CNB's sizable liquid funds deriving from
deposits was reviewed during negotiations. The average maturity of these
deposits is very short, in most cases, less than one year. In the present
circumstances, bearing in mind the volatile nature of the financial environ-
ment in which CNB operates, e.g. the Government's attempt to control inflation
by restricting credit, it is regarded generally inappropriate to use the
sizable liquid funds deriving from deposits for term lending. However, CNB's
management indicated that it would seek ways, in the context of the Govern-
ment's overall credit policies, to gradually and substantially expand its
domestic currency lending operations so as to make fuller use of its existing
and prospective deposits, thereby reducing the gap between its resource
mobilization and its resource allocation, while at the same time continuing
to give due consideration to the nature (generally short-term) of the
maturities of these deposits.
5. THE PROPOSED BANK LOAN
Recommendations and Justification
5.01 The continued growth of small-scale industries remains an
important element in Korea's development strategy in view of their demon-
strated contribution to employment creation, expansion of exports, deepen-
ing of the industrial structure, and regional dispersal of industry. The
shortage of funds, particularly of term finance available at appropriate
terms has been a crucial problem faced by the small enterprises. Statistics
available show that the ratio of reliance on bank credit decreases as the size
of the enterprises becomes smaller and a considerable number of small
enterprises have no alternative but to borrow from the curb market, or to
postpone their projects. It is estimated that less than half of the demand
for funds from the small enterprises in the past has been satisfied.
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5.02 CNB, as the only specialized financial institution catering exclu-
sively to the small industries, is in a position to play a vital role in
assisting such firms to meet their financial requirements. CNB has been
assisting small industrial firms, including a number of very small ones.
During the period from January 1975 to September 1979, 88% of CNB's
equipment loans, both by number and by amount, went to projects employing
less than 50 workers, including 71% which went to projects employing less
than 20 workers. CNB's projects have been highly labor intensive. An
analysis of a sample of CNB-financed projects implemented during 1975-78
indicates that the average fixed investment cost-per-job created was around
US$7,885 which is relatively low in Korea. CNB is the only financial
institution authorized to handle the Mutual Installment Savings and
Remuneration Scheme. This Scheme embodying the principle of linking
deposits with lending for specific purposes has proved very effective in
attracting deposits and encouraging investments. Because of the assurance
of a loan, the small entrepreneur has an inducement to save. Without such
assurance, in many cases, there would not be savings enough for investment by
SSIs. CNB has an extensive branch network throughout Korea. As of December
31, 1979, CNB had 163 branches while SMIB had 112, KDB 9 and KDFC one. CNB's
branches have day-to-day contacts with small industries located in various
provinces. Through such a broad network, CNB is in a position to reach out to
provide assistance to the SSI sector more effectively.
5.03 In the past, CNB was handicapped by the lack of access to foreign
exchange resources as well as long-term domestic funds. On December 19,
1977, CNB's Act was amended to allow CNB to borrow from foreign sources. In
MIay 1979, CNB obtained from ADB a loan of US$10 million which enabled CNB to
start its foreign currency lending operations. In March 1980, CNB was
designated as a handling intermediary for the SMI Promotion Fund. Having
now obtained access to foreign funds and to the SMI Promotion Fund, CNB is
expected to play a larger role in developing and modernizing the small
industries in Korea. The Bank has, in the past, been associated with three
DFCs in Korea (KDB, KDFC and SMIB). While SMIB has been using the Bank
funds to support small- and medium-sized industries, its assistance to the
very small ones has been limited and therefore the investment demand of a
number of them still remains unsatisfied. CNB, with a branch network which
is more extensive than any banking institution in Korea and with a solid
clientele built up under the Mutual Installment Savings and Remuneration
Scheme, is in a better position to reach the small industries in various
regions and help them fill the resource gaps, thus enabling these small
enterprises to enhance their contribution to the dispersal of industries,
expansion of exports and nonfarm employment creation.
5.04 A Bank loan of US$30 million is recommended, which is expected to
finance approximately 54% of CNB's projected foreign currency loan approvals
/1 CNB is exempted from paying corporate income tax on its income. How-
ever, it is required to pay defense tax.
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over a two-year period from mid-1980 to mid-1982. The proceeds of the loan
will be used primarily to finance procurement of machinery and equipment
needed for modernization, rationalization, or expansion of productive capa-
cities of the small enterprises in all regions. It is estimated that
the subprojects financed under the proposed loan, approximately 150 in
number, would be able to create about 5,000 new jobs. One underlying
assumption is that approximately 15-20% of the subprojects would require
replacement equipment for rationalization or modernization and the number
of new jobs to be created in such cases would be very limited. Starting
with this operation, the Bank will be continously involved in upgrading the
project appraisal capabilities within CNB. Given the added function of
providing long-term domestic and foreign currency loans, CNB is ecpected
to become more involved in development activities, while maintaining an
undiminished role in meeting the short-term financial requirements of the
businesses and general populace.
5.05 In sum, the proposed loan will increase the flow of resources to
SSI enabling realization of new, modernization and expansion projects, will
contribute to greater regional dispersal of investment and will achieve
important institution-building objectives by strengthening the capability of
CNB to service the needs of the SSI sector in Korea. Particularly at this
juncture when Government is making a concerted effort to develop the small-
and medium-sized industries (as evidenced by the establishment of a new
institution - SHIPC, and granting of new authority to CNB to engage in
foreign currency operations), the Bank's association with CNB will assist
the Government, CNB and the SSI enterprises in achieving their objectives.
The project does not entail any unusual risk.
Main Features of the Loan
5.06 Scope of Financing. The proposed loan will support small indus-
trial, mining and transportation firms with no more than 100 employees and
construction and service firms with no more than 20 employees, or firms with
total assets not exceeding W 500 million.
5.07 Maximum Size of Subloans. While the current regulations restrict
the amount up to which CNB can make term loans in domestic currency to W 30
million (US$51,724), there is no limitation on its foreign currency loans
extended from its foreign resources. In order to ensure that the proceeds
of the Bank loan are utilized by a large number of SSI borrowers, it is
recommended that the size of individual subloans approved by CNB under the
Bank loan will not exceed US$400,000 equivalent.
5.08 Geographical Distribution of Subloans. To encourage a broader dis-
persal of the Bank loan outside the metropolitan area, it is recommended that
no more than 50% of the loan will be used to finance projects located within
the city limits of Seoul.
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5.09 Free Limit. In order to enable the Bank to monitor closely the
project appraisal work of CNB, an initial free limit of US$250,000, is
proposed. In addition, the first five subprojects to be financed under the
loan will be submitted to the Bank for prior approval, irrespective of subloan
size. With the proposed free limit it is estimated that roughly one-third
of the number of subprojects under this loan (accounting for about one-half of
the loan amount) would require prior approval by the Bank.
5.10 Economic Evaluation of Subprojects. In order to ensure that the
economic viability of projects will be taken into consideration in the
decision-making process, CNB should be encouraged to pay more attention
to the economic evaluation of projects. It is recommended that the Economic
Rate of Return will be calculated for all subloans above the free limit.
5.11 Component for Financing Smaller Enterprises. Under the current CNB
Act and regulations, CNB is permitted to make loans to small-scale manufac-
turing, mining and transportation enterprises employing 5 to 100 workers and
construction and service enterprises employing 5 to 20 workers. In order to
ensure access of the smallest firms to Bank funds, it is recommended that at
least 50% of the Bank loan be used to make subloans to the SSI firms employ-
ing no more than 50 workers or with total assets below W 250 million.
5.12 Debt/Equity Ratio. Under the loan agreement signed between ADB
and CNB in May 1979, CNB is required to maintain a long-term debt/equity
ratio of 7:1. Debt will incude all long-term debt and guarantees but
exclude current maturities of such debt, savings under the Mutual Install-
ment Savings and Remuneration Scheme and reserve requirement by Bank of
Korea. It is recommended that the same debt/equity ratio be accepted by
the Bank.
5.13 Relending Rate. CNB intends to onlend the proceeds of the
proposed Bank loan at an interest rate of 2 percentage points above its
own borrowing rate (i.e., 10.5% p.a. assuming a Bank relending rate of 8.5%
p.a.). This is in line with the general practice of government-owned deve-
lopment financial institutions in Korea in relending the proceeds of their
borrowings from institutional sources (IBRD, ADB et al). While during the
initial period CNB's costs for processing foreign currency loans may exceed
the 2% spread, CNB expects to cover such losses by its earnings on other
operations. The interest rate policy on foreign borrowings will be kept
under constant review by the Government.
5.14 Financing of Locally Produced Equipment. Sixty percent of the cost
of machinery and equipment (including off-the-shelf equipment already impor-
ted into the country) procured locally by CNB borrowers, representing the
estimated foreign exchange component of such capital goods, will be eligible
for financing under the proposed loan.
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5.15 Amortization Schedule. As is usual with Bank loans to DFCs, the
proposed loan would have a flexible amortization schedule which would sub-
stantially reflect the aggregate of the repayment schedules of the indivi-
dual subloans made by CNB. The loan is expected to be fully repnsid within
17 years, including a grace period of 3 years. The estimated disbursement
schedule is presented in Annex 28.
Agreements and Understandings Reached at Negotiations
5.16 During loan negotiations:
(a) understandings were reached with the Government to the effect
that:
(i) CNB would endeavor to increase its share capital in order to
strengthen its equity base as necessary to keep pace with the
growth of its liabilities and operations (para. 4.63); and
(ii) CNB to be designated in March 1980 as a handling intermediary
in allocating the resources made available by SMI Promotion
Fund (for which so far only SNIB has been designated as the
handling intermediary) (para. 4.19).
(b) agreements and/or understandings were reached with CNB with
respect to:
(i) the limitation of the scope of financing under the Bank loan
to small industrial, mining and transportation firms with no
more than 100 employees and construction and service firms
with no more than 20 employees, or firms with total assets
not exceeding W 500 million each (para. 5.06);
(ii) a ceiling of US$400,000 on the size of individual subloans
(para. 5.07);
(iii) a minimum of 50% of the Bank loan for financing subprojects
employing up to 50 workers, or with total assets not
exceeding W 250 million each (para. 5.11);
(iv) a ceiling of up to 50% of the Bank loan for financing sub-
projects within the city limits of Seoul (para. 5.08);
(v) a free limit of US$250,000, with the first five projects to
be submitted to the Bank for prior approval irrespective
of size (para. 5.09);
(vi) economic rate of return calculation for all subprojects
above the free limit (para. 5.10); and
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(vii) the financing of 60% of the cost of machinery and equipment
(including off-the-shelf equipment) procured locally by CNB
borrowers, representing the estimated foreign exchange
component of such capital goods (para. 5.14).
5.17 In addition the Bank reviewed and reached understandings with CNB
on the objectives outlined by CNB in its proposed Statement of Development
Strategy for 1980/81 (Annex 11).
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KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Trends in the Manufacturing Sector
(Amounts in W billion)
Investment
Number of No. of workers in tangible
establishments ('000) Value added fixed assets
Sml. Med. Lg. Sml. Med. Lg. Sml. Med. Lg. Sml. Med. Lg.
1973 21,392 1,201 700 334 205 618 234 236 911 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1974 20,471 1,375 786 345 236 717 307 276 1,284 65 82 442
1975 20,290 1,624 873 371 278 771 430 465 1,932 84 83 671
1976 21,938 1,990 1,029 424 333 961 586 636 2,853 151 145 822
1977 23,299 2,382 1,085 480 403 1,036 886 929 3,782 145 220 971
Source: EPB.
AEP Projects Department
December 15, 1979
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ANNEX 2
KORFA
CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Structure of the Manufacturing Sector, 1977
Value added (in W billion) Employment ('000)
Sectoral Small /a Med. /b Large /c Total Small Med. Large Total
Breakdown
Food, beverages,
tobacco 141.1 186.9 740.7 1,068.7 58.8 29.1 81.4 169.3
Textiles,
clothing,
leather 179.3 217.7 698.3 1,095.3 138.3 167.7 351.8 657.8
Wood, wood
products 43.7 13.9 80.7 138.3 25.0 6.9 38.5 70.4
Paper & paper -
products 62.7 44.4 125.4 232.5 36.5 17.6 30.5 84.6
Chemicals,
rubber,
plastics 133.4 160.5 732.8 1,026.7 49.2 37.5 151.7 238.4
Nonmetallic
minerals 85.6 70.4 135.7 291.7 24.2 21.1 32.5 77.8
Basic metals 34.3 31.5 260.3 326.1 16.4 13.4 41.2 71.0
Machinery &
equipment 179.8 175.5 957.0 1,312.3 109.8 88.2 '70.8 468.8
Others 26.2 27.Q 51.1 105.2 21.4 22.0 37.6 81.0
Total 886.1 928.7 3,782.0 5,596.8 479.6 403.5 1,036.0 1,919.1
Regional
Distribution of
Manufacturing
Seoul City 272.6 241.8 882.6 145.1 121.5 270.8
Busan City 118.1 126.7 457.8 59.7 61.6 227.7
Gyeonggi Do 170.9 249.4 845.1 82.7 94.5 213.2
Other provinces 324.4 310.7 1,596.5 192.1 125.7 324.3
Total 886.0 928.6 3,782.0 479.6 403.3 1,036.0
/a Small: enterprises employing 5 to 100 workers.
/b Medium: enterprises employing 100 to 300 workers.
/c Large: enterprises employing over 300 workers.
Source: EPB Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey, 1977.
AEP Projects Department
December 15, 1979
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ANNEX 3
KOREA
CITIZEN NATIONAL BANK
Structure of Financial System, 1978
Credit out-
standing /a No. of
Assets % end 1978 branches
(W billion) (W billion)
A. MONETARY SYSTEM 26,903.6 81.6 - 1,790
1. The Bank of Korea 4,869.4 14.8 - 13
2. Commercial Banking System
(Deposit Money Banks)/b 22,034.2 66.8 8,224.6 1,777
a. Commercial Banks 13,626.7 41.3 5,316.9/c 880
(i) Five nationwide commercial
banks /d 11,120.9 33.7 3,940.9 550
(ii) Ten local banks 1,524.0 4.6 664.9 286
(iii) Branches of foreign banks 981.8 3.0 711.1 44
b. Specialized Banks 8,407.5 25.5 2,907.7 897
(i) Korea Exchange Bank 4,591.6 13.9 736.3/e 80
(ii) Small-Medium Industry Bank 737.6 2.3 436.6/f 109
(iii) Citizens National Bank 871.0 2.6 446.4/f 162
(iv) Korea Housing Bank 624.4 1.9 378.0/f 90
(v) Credit sector of agri-
cultural cooperatives 1,417.0 4.3 785.6/g 367
(vi) Credit sector of fisheries
cooperatives 165.9 0.5 124.8/g 89
B. NONBANKING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 6,072.9 18.4 - 2,525
1. Development Banks /h 2,432.9 7.3 1,769.4 23
a. Korea Development Bank 2,029.7/i 6.1 1,451.7/i 17
b. Korea Development Finance -
Corporation 164.4 0.5 153.3 1
c. Korea Export and Import Bank 238.8 0.7 164.6 5
2. Trust Accounts 868.7 2.6 - -
3. Insurance Companies 676.4 2.0 - 1,950
a. Life insurance companies 355.0 1.1 - 1,290
b. Nonlife insurance companies 321.4 0.9 - 660
4. Short-Term Finance Companies /i 685.3 2.1 - 11
5. Mutual Savings and Finance Companies /k 215.6 0.7 - 275
6. Postal Savings Accounts 30.1 0.1 - -
7. Securities Firms 1,163.9 3.6 - 266
a. Korea Securities Finance
Corporation 91.8 0.3 - 1
b. Security dealers & brokers (net) 667.3 2.0 - 263
c. Investment trust companies (net) 404.8 1.3 - 2
Total 32,976.5 100.0 - 4.315
/a Calculated only for commercial banking system and the development banks.
/b Deposit money banks as defined by BOK.
/c Comprises loans from banking funds, government funds, foreign loans and
personal loans.
/d Excludes trust accounts and accounts of overseas branches, but includes
banking account of Bank of Seoul & Trust Company.
/e Comprises loans and discounts, foreign exchange and personal loans.
/f Comprises loans from banking funds, government funds and personal loans.
/g As for /f, but including overdrafts.
/h The Korea Land Bank is excluded.
/i This excludes W 3,898 billion in acceptances.
/1 This includes the five merchant banks.
/k Includes credit unions.
Sources: April 1979 Monthly Economic Statistics, BOK; and CNB; and
Bank Report 2488-KO.
AEP Projects Department
December 15, 1979
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ANNEX 4
Page 1
KOREA
CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Rates of Interest in Korea as of January 12. 1980
(Percent per annum)
A. Commercial Banks
Deposit Rates
a. Time Deposits
1 month or over (negotiable) 13.14
3 months or over 19.2
6 months or over 21.3
Over 1 year 24.0
b. Installment Savings
6 months 18.6
1 year 20.6
1-1/2 years 21.6
2 years 22.6
2-1/2 years 23.8
3 years 25.0
c. Wage Earners Savings Scheme /a
I year 27.5 (15.4)
2 years 30.3 (16.9)
3 years 33.5 (18.6)
5 years 36.5 (20.6)
d. Demand Deposits
Temporary deposits 1.0
Passbook deposits 1.8
Lending Rates
a. Operating Funds
Ordinary Loans
Prime enterprises 24.5
Other enterprises 25.0
/a Figures in parentheses show the base rates payable by the financial
institutions; the remainder is subsidized by Government.
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ANNEX 4
Page 2
A. Commercial Banks (Cont.)
(%)
Commercial Notes
Prime enterprises 24.5
Other enterprises 25.0
Overdraft /a
Prime enterprises 26.5
Other enterprises 27.0
b. Term Loans /a
Less than 3 years 24.5
3 to 8 years 25.5
Over 8 years 26.5
c. Export Finance /b 15.0 (12.0)
d. National Investment Fund 22.0
e. Machinery Industry Loans 21.0
f. Loans with Installment Collateral 24.5-25.0
g. Loans on Installment Savings 24.5-25.0
h. Loans Overdue 30.0
/a These rates are 0.5% p.a. higher for the Busan, Daegu, Kyonggi and
Kyongnam banks, and 0.5% higher for the other local banks.
/b Rate in parenthesis will be applied until June 30, 1980.
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ANNEX 4
Page 3
B. Korea Development Bank
Up to 3 3 to 8 Over 8
years years years
(%) (%) (%)
Capital Loans /a
Government Funds 15.0 15.0 15.0
Machine Industry Promotion Funds 21.0 22.0 23.0
Special Equipment Funds 21.0 22.0 -
Internal Funds (priority
industries) 21.0 22.0 23.0
Internal Funds (nonpriority
industries) 24.5 25.5 26.5
Foreign Commercial Funds /b 18.0 18.0 18.0
Working Capital Loans /a
Government Funds 15.0 15.0 15.0
Machine Industry Promotion Funds 21.0 21.0 21.0
Special Equipment Funds 21.0 21.0 21.0
Internal Funds (prime clients) 24.5 24.5 24.5
Internal Funds (other clients) 25.0 25.0 25.0
Foreign Commercial Funds /b 18.0 18.0 18.0
National Investment Fund /a /c 21.0 22.0 -
Tourism Development Fund /a /c 25.0 25.0 25.0
Industrial Rationalization Funds /a
Direct Loans 21.0 22.0 -
Through banking institutions 19.5 20.5 -
Government Special Fund Loans /a Id 7.5-13.5 7.5-13.5 7.5-13.5
Foreign Currency Loans
Foreign Commercial Funds /e LIBOR + 1.0 LIBOR + 1.125 LIBOR + 1.25
USAID (3rd loan) 10.0 10.0 10.0
KfW (4th loan) 9.0 9.0 9.0
ADB (5th loan) 9.65 9.65 9.65
IBRD (3rd loan) 9.5 9.5 9.5
Penalty Rate on Overdue Loans 30.0 30.0 30.0
/a In domestic currency.
lb Exchange risk passed on to borrowers.
Ic Capital and working capital loans.
/d For power development, shipbuilding, coal mining, public utilities,
maritime transportation, railways and roads.
/e Export industries only.
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ANNEX 4
Page 4
C. Small and Medium Industry Bank
,(%
Foreign Currency Loans
IBRD Loan 1175-KO 10.5
IBRD Loan 1507-KO 9.9
IBRD Loan 1749-YO 9.9
AD3 fourth loan 10.9
Korea foreign exchange /a
3 years or less LIBOR + 1.0
Over 3 years LIBOR + 1.125
Cver 7 years LIBOR + 1.25
Domestic Currency Loans
Same as commercial banks, KDB
D. Citizens National Bank
Deposit Rates
Checking deposits (business)
Temporary deposit
Passbook deposits 1.8
N4otice deposits (30 days) 10.0
Savings deposits (30 days) 12.6
Time deposit: 3 months 19.2
6 months 21.3
1 year 24.0
Over 1 year 24.0
Installment savings: 6 months 18.6
12 months 20.6
18 months 21.6
24 months 22.6
30 months 23.8
36 months 25.0
Property formation savings: 1 year 27.5
2 years 30.3
3 years 33.5
5 years 36.5
11utual installment receipts 15 ronths 20.6
20 months 21.6
25 months 22.6
30 months 23.8
35 months 25.0
40 months 25.5
45 months 26.0
50 nonths 26.5
55 months 27.0
60 months 27.5
/a For Y loans, add 1%.
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Lending Rates
Working Capital Loans
On remuneration basis 24.08 - 21.16
On bills 24.5 - 25.0
Overdrafts 26.5 - 27.0
Discount on bills 24.5 - 25.0
On installrnent savings 24.5 - 25.0
Populace (Consumer) Loans
On remuneration basis 24.08 - 21.16
On bills 25.0
With sajing as collateral 25.0
On installment savings 25.0
Facility (Equipment) Loans
On mutual installment basis 24.08 - 21.16
On bills 24.5 25.0
E. Bank of Korea
Lending Rates
To: Government 2.0
Exports /a 10.0 (7.0)
Raw material imports 18.0
Discount Rates
Prime enterprises 20.5
Other enterprises 21.0
Other bills 27.0
/a Rate in parenthesis will be applied until June 30, 1980.
AEP Projects Department
February 29, 1980
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KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Major Shareholders
(As of November 30, 1979)
Shareholder No. of shares Amount (Won million) %
Government 6,558,815 3,279.4 65.6
Commercial Banks
Hanil Bank 792,752 396.4 7.9
Korea First Bank 792,118 396.0 7.9
Cho-Heung Bank 669,872 334.9 6.7
Commercial Bank of
Korea 669,872 334.9 6.7
Bank of Seoul and
Trust Co. 488,000 244.0 4.9
Others 28,571 14.3 0.3
Total 10,000,000 5,000.0 100.0
AEP Projects Department
December 15, 1979
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ANNEX 6
KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Board of Directors
(As of November 30, 1979)
Name Position Background
Chung, Jin Wook President Career spent mainly in CNB. Joined
CNB in 1962. Appointed Director
April 1972. Deputy President since
February 1976. Appointed President
May 1979.
Yun, Chul Soon Deputy President Served in BOK from 1948 to 1960,
then CNB. Appointed Director June
1973 and Deputy President May 1979.
Kim, Sang Chan Director Career spent mainly in CNB. Joined
CNB in 1962, Director since June
1975. Reappointed in June 1978.
Yoo, In Ho Director Career spent mainly in BOK. Appointed
Director in February 1976. Re-
appointed February 1979.
Rha, Sung Woong Director Career spent mainly in CNB. Joined
CNB in 1963. Director since April
1977.
Chey, Byung Churl Director Career spent mainly in CNB. Joined
CNB in 1963. Director since December
1977.
Chang, Yeung Keun Director Served with MOF. Appointed Auditor
of CNB in September 1977. Director
in May 1979.
Suh, Jai Kyun Auditor Career spent mainly in SMIB. Appointed
Auditor in May 1979.
AEP Projects Department
December 15, 1979
KOREA
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Staffing as of September 30. 1979
Manager Level Others
Financial Economist/
analyst/ market Engi- Law- Sub- Janitors Sub-
Department accountants analysts neers yers Bankers total Clerks & others total Total
International Dept. 5 5 - 5 5 20 22 - 22 42
Planning Dept. 5 2 - 2 4 13 15 - 15 28
Research Dept. 4 4 - 4 2 14 20 3 23 37
Personnel Dept. 5 2 - 4 4 15 25 6 31 46
Educational & Training
Department 1 2 - 1 3 7 9 - 9 16
Funds Mgmt. Dept. 5 4 - 5 9 23 58 1 59 82
Savings Dept. 1 3 - 4 3 11 21 2 23 34
Property Formation
Savings Dept. 3 1 - 3 2 9 11 - 11 20
Loan Admin. Depts. 2 4 - 5 5 16 19 - 19 35
Credit Analysis
Dept. 5 1 4 2 2 14 19 1 20 34
Gen. Svs. Dept. 4 1 2 4 14 25 44 103 147 172
Loan Mgmt. Dept. 1 1 - 2 5 9 9 4 13 22
EDPS Dept. 5 5 - 1 9 20 134 - 134 154
Securities Agency
Dept. 1 1 - 3 3 8 32 - 33 41
Security & Guards
Office 3 1 - 3 4 11 17 29 46 57
Business Improve-
ment Office 2 1 - 1 2 6 4 - 4 10
Secretarial Office - - - 1 2 3 10 - 10 13
Busan Area Activity
Promotion Dept. 2 2 - 1 3 8 5 5 10 18
Auditing Office 9 10 - 11 30 60 5 - 5 65
Subtotal 63 50 6 62 111 292 480 154 634 926
Business Dept. &
Branches 235 134 1 139 531 1,040 3,813 637 4,450 5,490
Total 298 184 7 201 642 1,332 4.293 791 5,084 6,416
Head office Branches Total
Professionals 300 /a 1,040 1,340
Non-professionals 634 4,450 5,084
Total 934 5.490 6,424
/a Including 8 members of the Board: President, Deputy President, Directors
(5) and Auditor.
AEP Projects Department
December 15, 1979
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THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT
As of November 30, 1979
General
Manager
Jin Uk Kim /
Deputy General Manager Deputy General Manager
T.S. Chang H.S. Kim
Foreign Exchange Export & Import Foreign Capital Foreign Loan Procurement
Division Licensing and Division Division DivisionFinancing Division
Chief: T.S. Chang Chief: C.W. Kim Chief: H.J. Kim Chief: Y.K. Kim Chief: J.S. Noh
Assistant Assistant Assis tant Assistant Assistant
Managers 3 Managers 3 Managers 3 Managers 4 Managers I
Clerks 4 Clerks 2 Clerks 2 Clerks 3 Clerks 2
Typists 2 Typists 1 Typists 1 Typists 2 Typists 1
Total 41
/1 In January 1980, Mr. Kyung Jae Min was
AEP Projects Departmnent appointed General Manager of the Inter-
December 15, 1979 national Department to replace Mr. Jin World Bank-21145
Uk Kim.
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KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Policy Statement
(Adopted by the Board of Directors
on August 10, 1979)
Objective
This policy statement is aimed at prescribing CNB's major policy
measures related to rendering financial assistance for the promotion of
small-scale industry.
Scope of CNB's Operations
CNB shall contribute to the economic development of Korea by
promoting, inter alia, the progress and advancement in small-scale industry
in conformity with the purposes as stipulated in the CNB Act, its
Enforcement Decree and the Government's policies. In order to achieve this
objective CNB will expedite the advancement of small-scale enterprises (as
defined in the Enforcement Decree of CNB Act and Loan Agreements of the
relevant foreign currency borrowings) as follows:
(a) providing various types of financial assistance such as the
lending of mutual installment remunerations (particular type of
loan), medium- and long-term facility loans, short-term working
capital loans, guarantees, etc; and
(b) engaging in the activities for the progress of small-scale
enterprises such as identification and development of new
projects, etc.
Development Policies
CNB will extend its financial assistance to the small-scale
enterprises in oraer to supplement their managerial and financial weakness.
Especially preference will be given to the following small-scale enterprises
which will effectively contribute to broadening the base of the national
economy:
(a) exporting enterprises designated by the Government;
(b) import-substitution industries and industries producing raw
materials;
(c) specialized enterprises or industries ancillary to large firms and
machinery industries;
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(d) enterprises with potential for export- and import-substitution;
(e) industries which will develop new products;
(f) indigenous industries and labor-intensive industries;
(g) industries effectively contributing to the enhancement of GNP and
employment; and
(h) industries contributing to industrial rationalization and
technical development.
General Operating Principles
(a) CNB will carry out its operations in accordance with sound
management and business principles and practices. It will expand its
operations in the field of small-scale industries.
(b) CNB will finance projects viable from the economic, technical and
financial point of view and it will give special attention to the quality of
management and the market prospects of projects.
(c) CNB will give assistance to applicants in the course of
application for lending and feasibility study.
(d) CNB will determine the repayment period of loans, including grace
period depending on nature, individual circumstance of the project and re-
payment ability of the borrower.
(e) CNB will appropriately supervise the use of its funds, the
progress of the project financed and the performance of the enterprise so as
to ensure that remedial action is promptly taken when problems arise.
(f) In the case of foreign currency loans, CNB will protect itself
against any loss resulting from changes in the rate of exchange between Won
and foreign currencies in which CNB's outstanding money obligations will
have to be met.
(g) CNB will exert its effort for diversified loan portfolio by
industrial sector and geographical allocation, in particular in the execution
process of local currency lending except for "Mutual Installment
Remuneration." In case of foreign capital subloan, CNB will observe the
provisions of the related Loan Agreements.
Financial Guidelines
CNB will endeavor to match maturities of its long-term and
short-term loans portfolios with maturities of its resources including
deposits.
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CNB will not seek to control any of the enterprises in which it
has financed nor will it participate in the management of such enterprises
except for the purpose of safeguarding its principal and interest.
In accordance with sound banking practices, CNB will secure
appropriate collateral for its loans and guarantees. However, in the case
of development project loans, CNB will be guided by considerations of
technical feasibility, financial viability and economic justification of the
projects and enterprises so assisted.
CNB will require eligible borrowers to finance a reasonable
portion of the total project cost from their own resources to ensure that
they have a reasonable stake in the projects financed by CNB.
Borrowers must not be in arrears in the repayment of either
principal and interest on any existing loan.
Limits on Assistance
UNB's total commitments in any one single enterprise in whatever
form, i.e., loans, guarantees or a combination thereof, will not exceed 25%
of the sum of its unimpaired paid-in capital, reserves and surplus.
CNB's limit on local currency loans and guarantees to any single
small-scale industry is the same as stipulated in subparagraphs 1,3 and 3-2,
paragraph 1, Article 20 of the Enforcement Decree of the CNB Act. However,
with respect to the lending of foreign capital for small-scale industry, CNB
is not subject to the above restrictions, but bound by the approval from the
Minister of Finance and subject to provisions of Loan Agreements of the
relevant foreign currency borrowings.
Management and Organization
CNB will cooperate with its clients in the establishment and
implementation of the planned project and will maintain effective
organization in order to enhance management capability and intensify
training for employees. CNB will also recruit sufficient number of
personnel specialized in the field of financial and economic analysis,
technique, accounting, law and so on.
Accounting
CNB will maintain adequate accounting records to reflect its
business operations and affairs in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles and standards.
CNB will engage a qualified and independent public accountant to
audit its books and financial statements every year.
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Provisions and Reserves
CNB will annually make appropriate allocations to the account of
provision for doubtful loans for the protection against bad debts.
CNB will allocate at least 25% of the profits to a reserve fund
every fiscal year until the reserve fund reaches the amount of the paid-in
capital.
AEP Projects Department
December 15, 1979
- 71 -
ANNEX 11
Page 1
KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATION4AL BANK
Development Strategy for 1980/81 /1
Outline
1. This development strategy is aimed at prescribing major development
policy measures of The Citizens National Bank (hereinafter refered to as the
CNB) witn emphasis given to acceleration of development activities of the CNB
for the promotion of small-scale industry.
2. Especially in parallel with the projected expansion of its financing
operations in the two-year period 1980/81, CNB shall further expand, apart
from its normal financing activity, its developmental and promotional
activities particularly in the specific areas outlined below.
Priority Area of Financing
3. CNB shall contribute to the national economic development by
expediting the advancement of small-scale enterprise.
4. Thus, main emphasis shall be given to the financial assistance to
small-scale enterprises in order to supplement their managerial and financial
resources which often lack access to most banking institutions.
5. Especially, the preference in selection of financing beneficiary
will be given to the following small-scale enterprises which will effectively
contribute to broadening the base of national economy.
(a) exporting enterprises designated by the Government;
(b) import-substitution industries and industries producing raw
materials; and
(c) specialized enterprises or industries ancillary to large firms and
machinery industries.
(d) enterprises with potential for export and import substitution;
(e) industries which will develop new products;
(f) indigenous industries and labor-intensive industries;
/1 This development strategy will come into effect subject to approval of
CIBOs Board of Directors.
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(g) industries effectively contributing to the enhancement of GNP and
employment; and
(h) industries contributing to industrial rationalization and technical
development.
Project Promotion and Resource Allocation
6. CNB shall make special efforts to assist an increasing number of
small-scale enterprises and labor-intensive projects in conformity with the
purposes as stipulated in the CNB Act, its Enforcement Decree and the
Government's policies.
7. In line with the Government's policy toward geographical distribu-
tion of small-scale industry to provincial areas, CNB shall make efforts to
increase the proportion of its financing to SSI located in provincial areas by
taking advantage of its nationwide branch network.
Resource Mobilization
8. CNB shall endeavor to increase the mobilization of household savings
in an effort to augment its domestic currency resources and to introduce
sufficient foreign currency resources from international financial institu-
tions. CNB shall also make continued efforts to raise long-term local
currency resources from relevant institutions concerned.
Research
9. With a view to providing more diversified financial services, and
expanding its operational activities in parallel with the rapidly developing
economic environment as well as securing stable basis for mobilizaion of
adequate domestic currency resources, CNB shall strengthen its research
capability and activities including "Small Manufacturing Industry Survey,"
with particular emphasis given on sector studies and market studies for
small-scale industry.
Organization
10. In connection with diversification and expansion of its operational
activities, CNB shall continue, as a matter of high priority, to enhance
professional abilities of its existing staff through adequate training courses
provided by domestic and foreign institutions with due consideration given to
the fields of financial and economic analysis, appraisal technique, account-
ing, law, and so on. CNB shall also adopt its organization as appropriate to
effectively carry out its expanding activities.
AEP Projects Department
December 15, 1979
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Summary of Loan Operations (1975-September 30, 1979)
(Won million)
1975 1976 1977 1978 Sept. 30, 1979
No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount
APPROVALS L
Working capital loans 43,042 111,984 45,633 108,996 46,412 169,163 34,377 152,463 21,067 136,539
Equipment loans 3,903 7,899 3,884 11,822 4,204 17,332 5,257 17,093 3,879 15,442
Total Business Loans 46,945 119,883 49,517 120,818 50,616 186,495 39,634 169,556 24,946 151.981
General populace loans /b 76,056 67,803 119,499 87,984 153,288 108,488 189,052 170,984 141,732 152,308
Total Approvals 123,001 187.686 169.016 208,802 203,904 294,983 228,686 340,540 166.678 304,289
REPAYMENTS
Working capital loans 36,386 91,331 31,993 77,630 51,116 138,077 51,947 121,668 26,713 84,223
Equipment loans 1,889 4,533 3,278 7,529 6,359 10,236 4,797 13,546 5,344 11,687
Total Business Loans 38,275 95,864 35,271 85,159 57,475 148,313 56,744 135,214 32.057 95,910
General populace loans /b 73,565 58,852 87,171 62,445 94,065 65,904 143,548 105,191 145,911 119,365
Total Repayments 111,840 154,716 122,442 147,604 151.540 214.217 200,292 240,405 177,968 215,275
OUTSTANDING
Working capital loans 63,733 112,182 77,373 143,548 72,669 174,634 55,099 205,429 49,453 257,745
Equipment loans 9,695 17,349 10,301 21,642 8,146 28,738 8,606 32,285 7,141 36,040
Total Business Loans 73,428 129,531 87,674 165,190 80,815 203,372 63,705 237,714 56,594 29-3,785
General populace loans /b 95,049 62,345 127,377 87,884 186,600 130,468 232,104 196,261 227,925 229,204
Total Outstanding 168,477 191,876 215,051 253,074 267,415 333,840 295,809 433,975 284,519 522,989
/a Given the nature of domestic currency operations, approvals are simultaneous with commitments and disbursements.
/b Including households and individuals.
AEP Projects Department
December 15, 1979
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Characteristics of Equipment Loans Approved (1975-September 30, 1979) /a
(Won million)
1975 1976 1977 1978 September 30, 1979
No. Amount % No. Amount Z No. Amount 2 No. Amount Z No. Amount Z
A. Sectoral Distribution
Manufacturing
Food, beverage and tobacco 253 320 4.0 245 528 4.5 273 734 4.2 292 802 4.7 105 410 2.7
Textile, wearing apparel & leather 571 1,485 18.8 568 2,205 18.7 616 3,239 18.7 831 3,656 21.4 456 2.264 14.7
Wood and wood products 39 747 9.4 36 1,172 9.9 31 1,716 9.9 45 1,746 10.2 39 573 3.7
Paper, paper products and printing 41 512 6.5 347 788 6.7 382 1,155 6.7 427 1,115 6.5 173 705 5.6
Chenicals, petroleum, coal, rubber
and plastic 560 932 11.8 419 1,096 9.2 439 1,606 9.3 493 1,762 10.3 224 808 5.2
Nonmetallic mineral products 194 406 5.1 199 586 4.9 216 858 4.9 403 692 4.1 123 305 2.0
ba:ic metals 232 292 3.7 234 404 3.4 249 593 3.4 292 720 4.2 79 215 1.4
Metal products, machinery and
equipment 773 745 9.4 555 1,298 11.0 601 1,981 11.5 789 1,973 11.5 446 1,183 7.7
Others - - - - - - - - - - - - 180 1,002 8.3
Total Manufacturing 2.663 5.439 68.7 2.603 8.077 68.3 2.807 11.882 68.6 3.572 12,466 72.9 1,825 7,465 48.4
Mining 19 95 1.2 25 142 1.2 30 243 1.4 34 279 1.6 12 87 0.5
Transportation 358 692 8.8 363 1,039 8.8 390 1,489 8.6 491 1,387 8.1 1,039 4,203 27.2
Construction 142 371 4.7 141 551 4.7 152 801 4.6 209 795 4.7 92 473 3.1
Others 722 1,302 16.6 752 2.013 17.0 825 2,917 16.8 951 2,166 12.7 911 3,214 20.8
Total 3,903 7.899 100.0 3.884 11.822 100.0 4.204 17.332 100.0 5,257 17.093 100.0 3,879 15,442 100.0
B. Geographical Distribution
Seoul city 2,384 4,423 56.0 2,328 6,608 55.9 2,518 9,939 57.3 3,163 9,727 56.9 2,024 7,169 46.4
Kyong-gi province 147 300 3.8 144 638 5.4 160 884 5.1 189 929 5.4 207 934 6.0
South Chungchung province 211 419 5.3 Z14 413 3.5 227 555 3.2 283 581 3.4 163 671 4.3
North Chungchung province 93 189 2.4 95 213 1.8 101 276 1.6 116 301 1.8 64 317 2.0
Kang Won province 82 166 2.1 82 556 4.7 91 797 4.6 107 807 4.7 79 415 2.7
South Jeon Ra province 95 250 3.2 128 409 3.4 147 607 3.5 163 612 3.6 135 551 3.6
North Jeon Ra province 121 244 3.1 120 354 3.1 130 526 3.1 158 524 3.1 163 523 3.4
South Kyungsang province 194 394 5.0 194 551 4.7 210 814 4.7 294 821 4.8 210 860 5.6
North Kyungsang province 261 521 6.5 263 907 7.6 280 1,335 7.7 364 1,345 7.9 292 1,464 9.5
Busan city 285 930 11.8 284 1,078 9.1 307 1,461 8.4 373 1,307 7.6 512 2,420 15.7
Cheju province 30 63 0.8 32 95 0.8 33 138 0.8 47 139 0.8 30 118 0.8
Total 3.903 7.899 100.0 3.884 11.822 100.0 4,204 17.332 100.0 5.257 17.093 100.0 3,879 15,442 100.0
C. Size of Loans
Up to W I million 589 300 3.8 586 460 3.9 630 410 2.4 617 366 2.2 331 149 0.9
W I mil. to W 5 nil. 2,886 4,172 52.8 2,870 8,060 68.2 3,007 11,050 63.7 3,559 6,236 36.5 2,758 7,410 48.0
W 5 mil. to W 10 nil. 390 2,897 36.7 388 2,522 21.3 420 2,940 17.0 744 4,672 27.3 536 3,998 25.9
W 10 mil. to W 20 mil. 38 530 6.7 40 780 6.6 103 1,751 10.1 229 3,146 18.4 189 2,310 15.0
W 20 nil. to W 30 mil. - - - - - - 44 1,181 6.8 108 2,673 15.6 65 1,575 10.2
Total 3.903 7.899 100.0 3,884 11.822 100.0 4.204 17,332 100.0 5.257 17,093 100.0 3.879 15.442 100.0
D. Number of Workers
5 to 20 workers 3,434 6,564 83.1 3,281 9,469 80.0 3,161 12,132 70.0 3,037 12,115 70.9 2,275 9,012 58.5
20 to 50 workers 317 762 9.6 338 1,641 13.9 494 3,334 19.2 1,197 2,094 12.2 1,137 4,506 29.2
50 to 100 workers 37 236 2.9 152 358 3.0 423 1,029 5.9 764 1,717 10.0 379 1,503 9.8
Subtotal (3,788) (7,562) (95.6) (3,771)(11,468) (96.9)(4,078)(16,495) (95.1)(4,998) (15,926) (93.1)(3,791) (15,021) (97.5
More than 100 workers 115 337 4.4 113 354 3.1 126 837 4.9 259 1,167 6.9 88 421 2.5
Total 3,903 7,899 100.0 3.884 11.822 100.0 4.204 17.332 100.0 5,257 17.093 100.0 3,879 15,442 100.0
E. Duration of Loans
Up to I year 54 239 3.0 47 609 5.1 43 516 3.0 39 407 2.4 4 48 0.3
1 to 3 years 2,071 4,264 54.0 1,836 6,265 53.0 2,312 9,520 54.9 2,657 10,207 59.7 2,657 10,761 69.7
3 to 5 years 1,778 3,396 43.0 2,001 4,948 41.9 1,849 7,296 42.1 2,561 6,479 37.9 1,218 4,633 30.0
Total 3.903 7.899 100.0 3.884 11.822 100.0 4.204 17.332 100.0 5.257 17.093 100.0 3,879 15,442 100.0
/a This table covers all equipment loans, including those on mutual remuneration and appraisal basis.
AEP Projects Department
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Socioeconomic Impact of a Sample of Equipment Loan from 1975 to 1978 /a
1978
No. of projects 87
Total project cost (Won million) 4,423
CNB's financing (Won million) 1,557
Share of CNB's financing (%) 35.2
Incremental annual sales (Won million) 7,300
Incremental annual value added (Won million) 2,745
No. of direct additional employment 806
of which: skilled 247
unskilled 422
others 137
Incremental annual gross exports (US$ million) 1.6
Increase in fixed assets (Won million) 3,082
Memorandum Items
Sales per employee (Won '000) 9,057
Value added per employee (Won '000) 3,406
Investment per employee (Won '000) 3,824
Ratio of sales to fixed assets (incremental) 2.4
Ratio of value added to fixed assets (incremental) 0.9
Ratio of value added to sales (incremental) 0.4
Export share of sales (%) 10.6
/a Table based on a very limited sample of 87 small industry equipment loans of
more than W 10 million made before July 1977.
AEP Projects Department
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Equity Portfolio as of September 30, 1979
(Won thousand)
Financial situation
Amount No. of % of total Dividends (profitable or not
Name of Company at cost shares shares (1978) profitable)
Korea Housing Bank 200,000 400,000 1.07 4,000 profitable
Bukook Mutual Savings and
Finance Company 1,499,770 1,499,700 99.99 0 not profitable
Korea General Chemical Corp. 327,887 655,773 0.37 0 not profitable
Others 25,720 34,216 - 3,130
Dae Han Electric Co., Ltd. 10,193 12,690 0.03 704 profitable
Mi Won Industrial Co., Ltd. 1,381 1,735 0.02 217 profitable
Seoul Mi Won Industrial
Co. Ltd. 8,172- 11,104 0.11 1,338 It
Dae Han Ink & Painting Co.
Ltd. 2,584 3,201 0.06 329
Yoo Han Pharmacy Co., Ltd. 936 857 0.01 28
Peyng Ann Textile Co., Ltd. 672 1,399 0.08 175
Sam Jin Aluminum Co., Ltd. 228 380 0.03 48 "
Sam Sung Paper Manufacturing
Co., Ltd. 271 615 0.05 62
Sam Sung Pharmacy Co., Ltd. 396 966 0.05 0 not profitable
Dong Kook Heavy Machinery
Co., Ltd. 757 1,009 0.06 202 profitable
II Shin Steel Co., Ltd. 130 260 0.002 27
Total 2,053,377 7,130
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THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Summarized Balance Sheets (1975-September 30, 1979)
(Won million)
Sept. 30
As of December 31, 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
ASSETS
Current Assets
Cash and checks 9,304 13,485 27,532 63,976 104,817
Due from Bank of Korea /a 34,410 45,802 69,379 79,646 128,037
Deposits with other
domestic banks 8,798 18,515 99,294 60,007 97,341
Foreign currency deposits - 6 20 29 56
Short-term loans:
Business loans 4,434 5,526 5,817 4,690 46,453
General populace loans /b 2,129 2,724 4,698 23,016 32,965
Total Short-Term Loans 6,563 8,250 10,515 27,706 79,418
Securities 320 14,066 1,361 19,246 79,015
Call loans - - - 90,000 50,000
Current maturities
Securities and deposits 6,485 12,480 43,021 93,729 93,188
Term loans 110,217 145,752 140,081 251,804 266,809
Other current assets 1,986 2,497 2,911 5,966 3,994
Total Current Assets 178,083 260,853 394,114 692,109 902,675
Medium/Long-Term Assets
Medium-term deposits with
domestic banks 879 673 435 239 102
Term loans:
Business loans 50,991 66,712 114,071 85,167 109,125
General populace loans /b 24,105 32,360 69,173 69,298 67,637
Total Term Loans 75,096 99,072 183,244 154,465 176,762
Less: Provisions for
doubtful loans (1,031) (1,017) (1,190) (924) (1,715)
Net Term Loan Portfolio 74,065 98,055 182,054 153.541 175,047
Equity investments 1,868 1,871 2,049 2,752 2,053
Other medium/long-term
assets 2,193 2,656 4,177 9,848 12,765
Fixed Assets
Premises & equipment (net) 6,498 7,465 8,195 10,303 20,737
Deferred Accounts - - - - 17
Total Assets 263.586 371,573 591,024 868,792 1,113,396
/a Including BOK's reserve requirements.
/b Including households and individuals.
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Sept. 30
As of December 31, 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
Current Liabilities
Demand deposits 59,696 83,193 111,641 161,173 222,724
Te > and savings deposits 76,035 101,154 190,364 291,867 395,820
Subtotal 135,731 184,347 302,005 453,040 618,544
Short-term borrowings - 21 1,690 - -
Debentures issued - - - - 1,516
Current maturities
Deposits 26,611 41,642 42,385 78,240 145,520
Borrowings 27 7 - - -
Other current liabilities 12,157 17,926 30,658 50,699 57,961
Total Current Liabilities 174,526 243,943 376,738 581,979 823,541
Medium/Long-Term Liabilities
Mutual installment receipts 59,345 75,216 97,802 121,314 129,753
Time & savings deposits 17,693 24,834 41,979 60,683 38,556
Property formation savings
deposits - 15,296 60,194 82,779 78,352
Total Term Deposits 77,038 115.346 199,975 264,776 246,661
Borrowings:
BOK 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,779
KDB - 30 30 27 5
Government 1,600 1,450 1,300 1,000 623
Debentures issued 879 673 435 239 134
Other long-term liabilities 19 13 16 35 24
Total Medium/Long-Term
Liabilities 81,036 119,012 203.256 267,577 249,226
Provisions for Retirement
Grants 384 384 1,660 8,160 13,718
Equity
Paid-in capital 4,500 4,500 5,000 5,000 5,000
Capital surplus 10 10 10 10 13,871/a
Legal reserves 745 841 1,095 1,395 1,922
Other reserves 2,275 2,275 2,575 2,925 4,124
Retained earnings 110 608 690 1,746 20
Current year's profit (loss) - - - - 1,974
Total Equity 7,640 8,234 9,370 11,076 26,911
Total Liabilities and
Equity 263,586 371,573 591,024 868,792 1,113,396
RATIOS
Current ratio 1.02:1 1.07:1 1.05:1 1.19:1 1.09:1
Current ratio (adjusted) /b 1.02:1 1.08:1 1.05:1 1.20:1 1.10:1
Total debt/equity 33.50:1 44.13:1 62.07:1 77.40:1 40.37:1
Long-term debt/equity 10.61:1 14.46:1 21.69:1 24.17:1 9.26:1
Long-term debt/equity
(adjusted) /c 4.00:1 6.20:1 12.40:1 14.40:1 5.25:1
Reserves & provisions
as % of loan portfolio 2.17 1.87 1.61 1.60 4.52
/a Including W 13,861 million of assets revaluation; W 13,800 million of which
would be reclassified as paid-in-capital at the year end.
/b Current assets + current maturities - remunerated mutual installment savings
to current liabilities + current maturities - remunerated mutual installment
savings.
/c Long-term debt + long-term guarantees - current maturities - reserve re-
quirements by Bank of Korea - remunerated mutual installment savings to
total unimpaired paid-in-capital, surplus and reserves.
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KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Summarized Income Statements (1975-September 30, 1979)
(Won million)
Sept. 30
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
INCOME
Interest on business
loans 17,553 21,432 28,460 35,133 33,704
Interest on general
populace loans 8,260 10,555 16,520 26,062 26,293
Interest on deposits
with domestic banks 1,486 1,776 11,306 16,625 15,796
Interests on securities 920 1,965 2,980 12,531 22,429
Total Interst Income 28,219 35,728 59,266 90,351 98,222
Dividends on investments 34 12 192 6 7
Profit on sales of
securities & investments 127 - 25 137 250
Fees and commissions 586 775 1,033 1,366 1,025
Other income 3,080 2,404 2,907 6,846 9,754
Gross Income 32,046 38,919 63,423 98,706 109,258
EXPENSES
Interest on mutual
installment receipts 6,217 7,660 11,033 14,059 13,761
Interest on deposits 12,514 16,084 31,149 48,874 58,609
Interest on borrowings 263 222 189 161 127
Total Interest Expenses 18,994 23,966 42,371 63,094 72,497
Fees and commissions 199 284 442 433 120
Contribution to Credit
Guarantee Fund 798 994 1,143 1,044 888
General administrative
expenses 11,083 12,083 17,524 27,070 29,490
Other expenses 246 218 319 3,961 2,971
Total Expenses 31,320 37,545 61,799 95,602 105,966
Income Before Provisions
and Tax 726 1,374 1,624 3,104 3,292
Provisions for doubtful
loans - - 192 734 800
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Sept. 30
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Income Before Tax 726 1,374 1,432 2,370 2,492
Tax 337 466 418 264 218
Net Income 389 908 1,014 2,106 2,274
Appropriations
Dividends 305 314 378 400 -
Reserves 96 554 650 1,726 -
Unappropriated retained
earnings (12) 40 (14) (20) -
Total 389 908 1,014 2,106 -
RATIOS
As Percentage of Average
Total Assets
Gross income 13.2 12.3 13.2 13.5 11.0
Financial expenses 7.9 7.6 8.9 8.6 7.3
Gross spread (Gross income
- financial expenses) 5.3 4.7 4.3 4.9 3.7
Return 8.1 8.0 9.1 9.0 7.6
General administrative
expenses 4.6 3.8 3.6 3.7 3.0
Provisions 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1
Income before provisions
and tax 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3
Net income 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2
Other Ratios
Net income as % of average
equity 5.1 11.4 11.5 20.6 12.0
Income on business loans as
% of average business loans
outstanding 13.6 14.5 15.4 15.9 12.7
Income on populace loans as
% of average populace loans
outstanding 13.2 14.1 15.1 16.0 12.4
Cost of deposits as % of aver-
age deposits outstanding 7.8 8.2 9.5 9.4 8.0
Cost of debt as % of average
debt outstanding 6.5 5.8 5.5 5.3 4.8
Dividend rate (%) 7 7 8 8
Dividend payout 78 35 37 18.9 -
Book value as % of par 170 183 187 222 -
Interest cover 3.98 4.06 4.01 3.88 -
Debt service cover 1.55 1.88 1.79 1.82 -
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ANNEX 18
KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Summarized Cash Flow Statement (1975-September 30. 1979)
(Won million)
Sept. 30
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
I. Sources
Operations:
Net income 389 908 1,014 2,106 2,274
Non-cash charges /a 729 332 2,645 8,740 8,100
Less:
Non-cash profit /b - - - 983 -
Subtotal 1,118 1,240 3,659 9,863 10,374
Received in mutual
installment receipts 71,901 93,904 129,590 161,458 140,851
Received in deposits 2,852,303 3,890,291 7,100,107 12,502,659 14,119,742
Borrowings: Bank of Korea 22,720 365 35 - 279
Others 23,440 2,150 16,750 153,390 12,170
Issued Property Formation
Debentures - - - - 1,548
Increase in other liabilities 90,353 138,578 224,494 282,881 439,808
Increase in Paid-in capital - - 500 - -
Subtotal 3,060,717 4,125,288 7,471,476 13.100,388 14,703,895
Collections:
Loans for business 98,198 85,159 148,313 135,197 95,910
Loans for general populace 56,503 62,431 65,886 105,191 119,356
Call-loan 164,640 470,410 684,040 1,481,900 2,898,800
Withdrawn in deposits with
domestic banks 458,224 833,809 1,383,147 3,804,704 3,874,912
Sale of securities 17,143 25,388 47,758 236,769 90,044
Sale of premises and equipments 434 464 255 1,539 357
Decrease in other assets 3,956 4,846 4,996 9,916 11,239
Subtotal 799.098 1,482.507 2,334,395 5,M.75,216 7,090,618
Total Sources 3,860,933 5.609,035 9,809,530 18,885,467 21,804,887
II. Uses
Disbursements:
Loans for business 119,883 120,818 186,495 169,556 151,981
Loans for general populace 67,803 87,984 108,488 170,984 152,308
Call-loan 164,640 470,410 684,040 1,571,900 2,858,800
Deposited with domestic banks 463,509 861,096 1,502,902 3,796,147 3,950,627
Purchase of securities 20,462 38,748 50,135 285,406 158,446
Acquired new premises and
equipments 1,396 1,763 1,334 3,996 2,208
Increase in other assets 3,979 5,819 7,159 18,636 12,201
Subtotal 841,672 1,586,638 2.,540,533 6,016,625 7,286,571
Withdrawn in mutural install-
ment receipts 53,285 72,514 101,587 131,299 112,174
Withdrawn in deposits 2,832,310 3,809,726 6,925,080 12,281,127 13,923,427
Repaid against borrowings 44,889 2,820 15,504 499 12,706
Decrease in other liabilities 87,273 132,845 211,742 418,135 428,079
Subtotal 3,017,757 4,017,905 7.253,913 12,831,060 14,476,206
Paid dividends 250 305 314 378 400
Paid retirement grants /c 324 - 689 951 842
Subtotal 574 305 1,003 1,329 1,242
Total Uses 3,860,003 5,604.848 9,795,469 18,849.014 21,764,019
/a Including costs of depreciation on tangible fixed assets, provisions on doubtful loans, and
provisions for retirement grants.
tb Including transfer of remaining amount of provisions on doubtful loans.
/L Retirement Grants for 1976 were paid in General Administrative Expenses, so figure in "Paid
Retirement Grants" of the year is not shown.
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ANNEX 19
KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Analysis of Loan Portfolio in Arrears. 1975-79
(Won million)
As of December 31, 1975 1976 1977 1978 Sept. 30. 1979
Number Amount Number Amount Number Amount Number Amount Number Amount
A. Portfolio Status
Total loans outstanding 168,477 191,876 215,051 253,074 267,415 333,840 295,809 433,975 284,519 522,989
Less: Outstanding loans
in grace period - - - - 295 3,960 358 4,416 295 4,334
Loans in repayment stage 168,477 191,876 215,051 253,074 267,120 329,880 295,451 429,559 284,224 518,655
Outstanding amount of
loans affected by
arrears 32,322 39,111 29,286 33,855 31,485 38,542 31,502 41,648 41,895 4,481
Arrears
Principal 32,322 2,768 29,286 2,170 31,485 2,293 31,502 2,447 41,895 4,481
Interest 1,245 873 1,062 2,119 /a
Total Arrears 4.013 3,043 3,355 4,566
Loans affected by arrears
as % of total loans
outstanding 19.2% 20.4% 13.6% 13.4% 11.8% --11.5% 10.7% 9.6% 14.7% 17.0%
Total arrears as % of
total loans outstanding 2.1% 1.2% 1.0% 1.1% 0.9Z/a
Total arrears of principal
as Z of total loans in
repayment stage 1.4% 0.9% 0.7% 0.6% 0.9%
Collection rate (Z)
Principal 97.8 98.4 98.7 99.0 98.0
Interest 95.4 97.4 97.7 96.7
Total 97.4 98.2 98.4 98.5
B. Reschedulings and Write-offs
Loans rescheduled 2,383 3,903 1,985 3,302 3,226 6,448 5,147 16,228 3,119 17,878
Loans written off 23 15 104 14 702 18 21 17 14 9
Total
C. Aging of Loan Arrears as of Outstanding loans principal
September 30, 1979 Number affected by arrears arrears
1 - 3 months 38,014 81,191 3,485
3 - 6 months 3,441 6,912 782
6 - 12 months 375 439 109
12 - 24 months 65 219 105
Over 24 months 
- - -
41,895 88.761 4.481
D. Loan Amounts ConsiRned to
the Korea Readjustment
Coporation for Collec-
tion /b
Consigned 
- - - - 3 26 8 105 4 48
Collected 
- - - - 2 13 2 48 8 94
/a Interest arrears as of September 30, 1979 are not available.
/b These amounts are included in arrears shown above.
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KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Resource Position as of December 31, 1979
Amount
I. Domestic Currency (Won million)
A. Long-Term Resources
Equity: Paid-in capital 30,000
Reserves and retained earnings 8,260
Total Equity 38,260
Borrowings: Government 423
BOK 279
KDB 4
Property formation debentures 35
Savings deposits (over one year) 402,191
Total Borrowings 402,932
Total Long-Term Domestic
Currency Resources 441,192
Less: Term loans outstanding 470,956
Fixed assets (net) 26,361
Investment in securities 61,947
BOK's reserve requirement 15,680
Other long-term assets 15,598
Total Long-Term Lending and Investments 590,542
Long-Term Resources Available for Further Commitment
and Disbursement /a (149.350)
B. Short-Term Resources
Demand and savings deposits (less than 1 year) 648,526
Property formation debentures 1,818
Total Short-Term Domestic Currency Resources 650.444
Less: Short-term loans outstanding 96,282
Investment in securities -
Other current assets _
BOK's reserve requirement 143,892
Total Short-Term Lending and Investments 240,174
Short-Term Resources Available for Further Commitment
and Disbursement /a 410,270
C. Total Domestic Currency Resources
Total Long-Term resources 441,192
Total Short-Term resources 650,444
Total Domestic Currency Resources 1,091,636
Less: Total Long-Term lending & investments 590,542
Total Short-Term lending & investments 240,174
Total Domestic Currency Lending and Investments 830.716
Total Domestic Curreny Resources Available
tfrTClurther Commitment and Disbursement /a 260.920
II. Foreign Currency Resources (US$ million)
Long-Term borrowings from ADB 5,829
Less: Foreign currency loans disbursed 0
Resources available for further disbursement 5,829
Less: Undisbursed loan commitments 584
Resources available for further commitments 5,245
Less: Uncommitted approvals 438
Net Resources Available for Further Approvals 4.807
/a Assuming that the time lag between commitment and disbursement is negligible.
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ANNEX 21
KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Projected Operations, 1979-84 /a
(Won million)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Approvals
Business Loans /b
Term Loans
Domestic currency 19,903 50,000 66,000 86,000 112,000 146,000
Foreign currency
ADB and IBRD 1,029 13,544 17,488 17,488 17,488 17,488
KFX Fund 
- 100 100 200 400 700
Working capital loans 180,269 200,000 264,000 344,000 448,000 584,000
General Populace Loans 200,325 260,000 330,000 430,000 560,000 730,000
Total Approvals 401.526 523.644 677.588 877,688 1.137,888 1,478,188
Commitments
Business Loans /b
Term Loans
Domestic currency 19,903 -50,000 66,000 86,000 112,000 146,000
Foreign currency
ADB and IBRD 584 9,034 14,572 17,487 17,487 17,487
KFX Fund 
- 100 100 200 400 700
Working capital loans 180,269 200,000 264,000 344,000 448,000 584,000
General Populace Loans 200,325 260,000 330,000 430,000 560,000 730,000
Total Commitments 401.081 519,134 674,672 877.687 1.137.887 1,478,187
Disbursements
Business Loans /b
Term Loans
Domestic currency 19,903 50,000 66,000 86,000 112,000 146,000
Foreign currency
ADB and IBRD - 4,663 11,658 17,487 17,487 17,487
KFX Fund 
- 100 100 200 400 700
Working capital loans 180,269 200,000 264,000 344,000 448,000 584,000
General Populace Loans 200,325 260,000 330,000 430,000 560,000 730,000
Total
Disbursements 400,497 514,763 671,758 877.687 1.157,887 1.478,187
/a Not including call loan operations which could generate transactions ranging
from W 1,740 billion to W 2,547 billion a year, during 1979-83 and temporary
investments in securities ranging from W 396 billion to W 559 billion a year
during the same projected period. Nor does this table include SMI Promotion
Fund loan operations in which CNB is expected to participate beginning 1980.
/b Including manufacturing, mining, transportation, construction and services.
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KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Forecast of Resource Position and Requirements. 1980-84
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
I. Domestic Currency (Won million) /a
A. Lon -Term Resources
Uncommitted resources (149,350) (214,998) (289,736) (364,907) (468,458)
Net income 5,950 8,512 11,924 15,336 19,598
Noncash charges 16,065 17,930 24,084 32,166 45,192
Government/BOK/KDB and SMIPC loans 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000
Net collections on long-term loans 273,920 361,257 471,443 615,028 802,584
Increase in long-term deposits (net of
reserve requirement) 66,864 79,864 126,888 161,444 204,305
paid-in share capital - 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
Total Lone-Term Resources 214,449 264,565 356.941 471.343 615,635
Less:
Addition to fixed assets 3,828 4,707 6,075 8,030 9,266
Increase in other long-term assets 2,339 1,794 1,973 2,171 2,387
Net Long-Term Resources for Commitment 208.282 258,064 348.893 461,142 603.982
New Loan Commitments
Equipment loans 50,000 66,000 86,000 112,000 146,000
Long-term working capital loans 158,000 208,560 271,760 353,920 461,360
Long-term general populace loans 215,280 273,240 356,040 463,680 604,440
Total Commitments 423.280 547.800 713.800 929.600 1.211.800
Year-End Long-Term Resource Position (214,998) (289.736) (364,907) (468,458) (607.818)
B. Short-Term Resources
Uncommitted resources 410,270 507,336 658,505 830,018 1,008,426
Increase in short-term deposits (net of
reserve requirement) 147,706 199,388 226,156 282,836 353,545
Collection of short-term loans 56,080 73,981 96,557 125,972 164,416
Total Short-Term Resources 614,056 780.705 981,218 1.238,826 1,526,387
Less:
Investment in securities 20,000 10,000 5,000 40,000 10,000
Net Short-Term Resources for Commitment 594,059 770,705 976,218 1.198.826 1,516.387
New Loan Commitments
Short-term working capital loans 42,000 55,440 72,240 94,080 122,640
Short-term general populace loans 44,720 56,760 73,960 96,320 125,560
Total Commitments 86,720 112.200 146.200 190,400 248,200
Year-End Short-Term Resource Position 507,336 658,505 830,018 1,008,426 1,268,187
C. Total Domestic Resources
Year-end long-term resources (214,998) (289,736) (364,907) (468,458) (603,982)
Year-end short-term resources 507,336 658,505 830,018 1,008,426 1,268,187
Year-end Total Domestic Currency
Resource Position 292.338 368.769 465.111 539.968 664,205
II. Foreign Currency (US$ thousand)
Uncommitted resources 8,998 23,500 28,500 28,500 28,500
Borrowings from:
ADB - 30,000 - 30,000 -
IBRD 30,000 - 30,000 - 30,000
KFX Fund 172 172 343 686 1,201
Total Foreign Currency Resources 39.170 53.672 58.843 59,186 59,701
New loan commitments 15,670 25,172 30,343 30,686 31,201
Year-End Foreign Currency Resource
Position 23,500 28,500 28,500 28,500 28,500
/a This table does not include SMI Promotion Fund resources and loan operations in which CNB is expected to
participate beginning 1980.
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KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Prolected Income Statements, 1979-84
(Won million)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
INCOME
Interest on business
loans 48,170 70,588 99,583 137,451 176,928 229,111
Interest on general
populace loans 36,795 57,046 87,022 124,271 163,310 213,175
Interest on foreign
currency loans - 149 1,028 2,461 4,293 6,063
Interest on deposits
with domestic banks 22,758 30,015 39,372 41,172 46,572 52,272
Interest on securities 24,736 29,374 36,694 41,622 47,022 53,022
Interest on call loans 8,771 5,000 6,250 7,500 13,750 17,500
Total Interest Income 141.230 192.172 269,949 354,477 451,875 571,143
Dividends on investments 7 1,830 2,079 2,256 2,256 2,256
Fees and commissions 1,391 1,692 1-,945 2,236 2,572 2,741
Other income 4,643 6,014 6,558 7,460 8,610 8,903
Gross Income 147,271 201,708 280,531 366.429 465,313 585,043
EXPENSES
Interest on mutual
installment receipts 17,773 23,090 31,654 50,783 67,708 84,268
Interest on deposits 77,363 109,785 159,449 199,778 249,173 311,186
Interest on borrowings
from BOK/Govt/SMIPC 155 128 421 904 1,586 2,490
Interest on foreign
borrowings - 111 803 1,944 3,391 4,757
Interest on debentures
issued 184 676 1,013 1,175 1,404 1,715
Total Interest Expenses 95,475 133,790 193,340 254,584 323,262 404.416
Contributton to Credit
Guarantee Fund 1,307 1,082 1,368 1,750 2,253 2,917
General administrative
expenses 42,154 57,570 72,867 92,259 116,853 148,054
Other expenses 4,321 550 660 792 950 1,390
Total Expenses 143,257 192,992 268,235 349,385 443,318 556.777
Income Before Provisions
and Tax 4,014 8,716 12,296 17,044 21,995 28,266
Provisions for doubtful
loans 1,516 1,716 2,282 3,016 3,953 5,210
Income Before Tax 2,498 7,000 10.014 14.028 18,042 23,056
Tax 375 1,050 1,502 2,104 2,706 3,458
Net Income 2,123 5,950 8,512 11,924 15,336 19,598
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KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Prolected Balance Sheets (1979-84)
(Won million)
As of December 31 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
ASSETS
Current Assets
Cash and checks 90,076 122,628 170,342 238,514 279,886 365,813
Due from Bank of Korea 185,053 197,630 252,100 317,550 378,150 472,650
Deposits with other domestic
banks 97,153 111,351 118,351 121,851 149,851 156,851
Foreign currency deposits 4 100 200 300 400 500
Short-term loans:
for business 53,905 67,345 85,825 110,208 142,128 184,632
for general populace 42,377 59,576 79,316 104,576 137,084 178,364
Total short-term loans 96,282 126.921 -165.141 214.784 279,212 362.996
Securities maturing within a year 88,379 100,526 106,426 109,326 132,926 138,826
Call loans - - - - - -
Other current assets 6,005 7,206 8,647 10,377 12,452 [4,942
Total current assets 562,952 666.362 821,207 1,012,702 1,232.877 1.512,578
Med ium/Long-Term Assets
Medium-term deposits with
domestic banks 41,898 47,700 50,700 52,200 64,200 67,200
Term loans in local currency
for business 266,958 333,518 425,038 545,792 703,872 914,368
for general populace 203,998 286,799 381,821 503,424 659,916 858,636
Term loans in foreign currency
An)B 
- 2,915 7,578 14,418 24,583 30,761
IBRD 
- 1,748 8,743 19,235 25,765 35,275
KFX funds 
- 100 200 400 800 1,500
Total term loans 470,956 625,080 823,380 1,083,269 1,414,936 1,840,540
Less: provisions for doubtful
loans 2,417 4,052 6,889 9,798 12,694 17,552
Net Term Loan Portfolio 468,539 621,028 816,491 1,073,471 1,402,242 1,822,988
Securities 61,947 69,800 73,900 76,000 92,400 96,500
Other medium/long-term assets 15,598 17,937 19,731 21,704 23,875 26,262
Fixed Assets
Premises and equipment (net) 26,361 30,189 34,896 40,971 49,001 58,267
Deferred Accounts 8 - - -
Total Assets 1,177,303 1,453,016 1,816,925 2_277,048 2.864.595 3,583,795
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As of December 31 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
Current Liabilities
Demand deposits 209,790 259,790 322,800 403,400 504,200 630,200
Time and savings deposits 435,958 556,832 723,984 904,755 1,130,832 1,413,428
Property formation savings
deposits 2,878 3,009 3,228 4,034 5,042 6,302
Subtotal 648.626 819,631 1.050,012 1,312,189 1,640,074 2,049.930
Debentures issued 1,818 3,430 3,920 4,606 5,586 6,860
Other current liabilities 63,986 76,783 87,139 100,568 132,981 159,881
Total Current Liabilities 714.430 899,844 1,141,071 1,417.363 1,778,641 2.216,671
Medium/Long-Term Liabilities
Mutual installment receipts 197,299 241,299 298,590 373,145 466,385 582,935
Time and savings deposits 64,344 82,470 97,226 114,000 137,483 169,337
Property formation savings
deposits 140,548 147,417 158,172 197,666 247,058 308,798
Subtotal 402,191 471,186 553,988 684,811 850,926 1,061.070
Borrowings frofa:
30K 279 100 200 400 800 1,500
KDB 4 - - - - -
SMIPC 
- 1,000 3,000 6,000 10,000 15,000
Government 423 373 373 173 - -
ADB 
- 2,915 7,578 14,418 24,583 30,761
IBRD 
- 1,748 8,743 19,235 25,765 35,275
Debentures issued 35 70 80 94 114 140
Total Medium/Long-Term
Liabilities 402,932 477,392 573,962 725,131 912,188 1,143.746
Provision for retirement grants 21,681 32,381 42,381 56,381 74,381 99,381
Equity
Paid-in capital 30,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000
Capital surplus 71 71 71 71 71 71
Legal reserves 1,922 2,547 4,297 6,547 9,547 13,297
Other reserves 4,124 4,831 6,631 9,631 14,431 21,031
Retained earnings 2,143 5,950 8,512 11,924 15,336 19,598
Total Equity 38,260 43,399 59,511 78,173 99.385 123.997
Total Liabilities and
Equity 1,177,303 1,453.016 1.816.925 2,277,048 2,864.595 3,583,795
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KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Projected Indicators of Financial Position and Performance, 1979-84
(Won billion)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
I. Total Assets 1,177.3 1,453.0 1,816.9 2,277.0 2,864.6 3,583.8
Of which:
Short-term loans 96.3 126.9 165.1 214.8 279.2 363.0
Mfedium/long-term loans 471.0 625.1 823.4 1,083.3 1,414.9 1,840.5
Deposits with other banks 139.0 159.0 169.0 174.0 214.0 224.0
Deposits and Long-Term Debt
Deposits (less than 1 year) 648.6 819.6 1,050.0 1,312.2 1,640.1 2,049.9
Depoits (more than 1 year) 402.2 471.2 554.0 684.8 850.9 1,161.1
Long-term debt:
BOK/Government/SMIPC 0.7 1.5 3.6 6.6 10.8 16.5
AfB/IBRD - 4.7 16.3 33.6 50.3 66.0
Equity 38.3 43.4 59.5 78.2 99.4 124.0
Debt-Equity Relationship
Total debt/equity ratio 29.2:1 33.6:1 30.5:1 28.9:1 28.4:1 28.4:1
Long-term debt/equity ratio /a 8.0:1 8.8:1 7.7:1 7.5:1 7.4:1 7.5:1
Long-term debt/equity ratio /b 3.7:1 4.1:1 3.5:1 3.4:1 3.4:1 3.5:1
(adjusted)
Current Ratio
Current ratio (adjusted) /c 1.13:1 1.12:1 1.11:1 1.11:1 1.11.1 1.11:1
II. Grnqq tncome as % of average
total assets 14.4 15.3 17.2 17.9 18.1 18.1
Pinancial expenses as % of
average total assets 9.3 10.2 11.8 12.4 12.6 12.5
2ross spread (gross income -
financial expenses) 5.1 5.1 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.6
Income before provisions and tax
as % of average total assets 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9
Income after provisions and tax
as % of average total assets 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6
Income after provisions and tax
as % of average equity 8.7 15.1 17.5 18.3 18.2 18.4
Reserves and provisions as % of
year-end outstanding loan
portfolio 2.1 2.4 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.6
Gleneral administrative expenses as
% of average total assets 4.1 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.6
Book value as % of par value 125 137 141 148 158 169
Cost of deposits as % of average
deposits outstanding 8.4 9.4 11.0 11.1 11.1 11.1
Cost of term debt as % of average
term debt outstanding 12.5 5.9 9.2 9.3 9.9 10.0
Cost of foreign currency debt as
% of average foreign currency
debt outstanding - 4.3 7.7 7.6 8.1 8.2
Income from business loans as %
of average business loans
outstanding 23.4 19.6 21.8 23.6 23.6 23.5
Income from populace loans as %
of average populace loans
outstanding 21.7 19.2 21.5 23.3 23.2 23.2
Income from foreign currency loans
as % of average foreign currency
loans outstanding - 3.6 9.1 9.9 10.1 10.3
/a Long-term debt - current maturities to total equity.
/b Long-term debt + long-term guarantees - current maturities - reserve requirements by BOK - re-
munerated mutual installment savings to total equity less dividends for current year.
/c Current assets + current maturities to current liabilities + current maturities.
AFP Projects Department
February 29, 1980
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Projected Cash Flow Statements. 1980-84
(Won million)
Ye.or ending December 31, 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
(actual)
SOURCES
Operations'
Net income 2,123 5,950 8,512 11,924 15,336 19,598
Noncash charges (deprecia-
tion & provisions) - net 15,651 16,065 17,930 24,084 32,166 45,192
Subtotal 17,774 22,015 26,442 36,008 47,502 64.790
Increase in deposits:
Mutual installment
receipts 41,528 44,000 57,291 74,555 93,240 116,550
Demand deposits 48,617 50,000 63,010 80,600 100,800 126,000
Savings deposits 144,190 139,000 181,908 197,545 249,560 314,450
Property formation
savings deposits 20,426 7,000 10,974 40,300 50,400 63,000
Subtotal 254,761 240.000 313.183 393.000 494,000 620.000
Borrowings:
BOK/KDB 279 100 100 200 400 700
SMIPC - 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000
ADB - 2,915 4,663 6,995 10,492 6,995
IBRD - 1,748 6,995 10,492 6,995 10,492
Others - - - -
Debentures issued 2,148 3,465 4,400 5,170 6,270 7,700
Subtotal 2.427 9.228 18,158 25.857 28.157 30.887
Loan collections:
Business loans 117,023 170,000 220,000 284,863 370,000 477,000
General populace loans 150,211 160,000 215,238 283,137 371,000 490,000
Call loans 3,762,300 1,620,000 2,025,000 2,430,000 4,455,000 5,670,000
ADB subloans - - - 155 327 817
IBRD subloans - - - - 465 982
Subtotal 4,029,534 3,048.036 4.107.292 5.468.736 8.902.663 12.197,606
Increase in other
liabilities 700,342 1,098,036 1,647,054 2,470,581 3,705,871 5,558,807
Increase in paid-in
capital 11,200 - 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
Sale of securities 95,094 195,000 221,000 234,000 241,000 293,000
Sale of fixed assets 102 150 200 250 300 400
Decrease in otber assets 11,285 15,338 17,851 20,148 22,777 25,792
Total Sources 5,134.689 3.529.767 4.714.126 6,187.999 9.746.399 13.242.475
USES
Disbursement of loans:
Business loans 200,172 250,000 330,000 430,000 560,000 730,000
General populace loans 200,325 260,000 330,000 430,000 560,000 730,000
ADB subloans - 2,915 4,663 6,995 10,492 6,995
IBRD subloans - 1,748 6,995 10,492 6,995 10,492
KFX Fund loans - 100 100 200 400 700
Call loans 3,672,300 1,620,000 2,025,000 2,430,000 4,455,000 5,670,000
Subtotal 4,072.797 2,134,763 2.696.758 3,307,687 5.592,887 7,148,187
Repayment of borrowings:
BOK/KDB/SMIPC 1,523 283 - - - -
Government 577 50 - 200 173 -
ADB - - - 155 327 817
IBRD - - - - 465 982
Others 12,170 - - - - -
Repayment of debentures
issued 534 1,818 3,900 4,470 5,270 6,400
Subtotal 2.634 2.151 3,900 4.825 6.237 8.199
Increase in deposits
with domestic banks 141,472 32,673 64,570 70,550 100,700 104,600
Investment in securities 172,414 215,000 231,000 239,000 281,000 303,000
New premises & equipment 1,708 5,000 6,000 7,500 9,600 11,000
Increase in other assets 17,105 18,878 21,086 23,851 27,023 30,669
Payment of dividends 400 811 3,200 4,000 4,800 5,600
Payment of retirement
grants 1,228 2,700 4,000 6,000 10,000 14,000
Decrease in other
liabilities 686,690 1,085,239 1,636,698 2,457,152 3,673,458 5,531,907
Total Uses 5.108.618 3.497.215 4.667.212 6,120.565 9,705.703 13.157.162
AEP Projects Department
February 29, 1980
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Underlying Assumptions for Operational and Financial Projections
I. Operational Projections
Loan Operations
1. In the case of local currency loans, there will be no tine lag
between approvals, commitment and disbursements.
2. In the case of foreign currency loans around 60% of foreign
currency loan approvals are expected to be conmitted in the current year and
40% in the following year. Around 45% of the comnitments are expected to be
disbursed in the current year and 55% in the following year. The time lag
for foreign currency loans financed with the Yorean Foreign F-xchange Fund is
negligible.
3. Total local currency loan approvals are estimated to reach
W 400 billion in 1979 and expected to increase at a rate of 30% thereafter.
(The 1979 forecast has been approved by the Yinistry of Finance.) Business
loans' share in the aggregate commitments will increase by 2%, p.a., while
general populace loans will decline. Twenty percent of business loans will
be for equipment purchases with 80% for working capital purposes.
4. Foreign currency loan approvals are estimated to amount to
US$5 million in 1979, US$20 million in 1980 and US$30 million each in
1981-83.
Projected Rates of Increase (Decrease) in Deposits
5. Based on the actual record of the past five years, rates of
increase (decrease) in deposits applied for projections are as follows:
Average
Type of deposits 1979 1980-83
…____(%) … -----
Itutual installment receipts 19 19.3
Demand deposits (9) 19.3
Time & savings deposits 20 19.7
Property formation deposits (54) 18.0
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Investment of Surplus Funds
6. Mobilized funds will be utilized to extend loans after reserves
have been deposited with BOK. Any balance will he used for investments in
marketable securities and deposited with other banks, at a ratio of 50:50
for such items.
7. The estimated amounts of investments in marketable securities are
arrived at on the basis of the average turnover rate (purchase anount for a
year as a percentage of outstanding balance at year-end) during the past
five years.
8. Since call loans are short term, the year-end balance of such
loans is assumed to be zero. the call-loan operations will increase by 10%
each year.
II. Financial Projections
Interest Rates
9. Interest income and expenses for local currency operations are
calculated by applying relevant interest rates to average balances of loans,
borrowings and deposits. A 2% spread on ADB and IBRD loans is included in
the projections.
General Administrative Expenses
10. General administrative expenses are assumed to increase at a rate
of 27.5% p.a.
Contribution to Credit Guarantee Fund
11. Annual contribution to Credit Guarantee Fund is computed at 0.5% of
the average business loans outstanding.
Provision for Doubtful Loans
12. With regard to provisions for doubtful loans, 0.5% of average
balance of general populace loans is accumulated to the account of special
provisions for doubtful loans, and 0.25% of average balance of foreign cur-
rency loans and 0.21% of average balance of business loans are allocated to
the account of ordinary provisions for doubtful loans.
Provision for Retirement Grants
13. In addition to regular accumulation, special contribution would be
made up to 1980 to cover up the deficit of W 4,204 million.
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Dividend Payment
14. Eight percent of paid-in capital.
Share Capital Increase
15. Paid-in capital is increased by U 25 billion in 1979 through
cash payment of W 11.2 billion and revaluation of assets amounting to
W 13.8 billion.
AEP Projects Department
December 15, 1979
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Estimated Commitments and Disbursements of Proposed Loan /a
(US$ million)
Commitments Disbursements
Amount % lb Amount x lb
FY81
July-September 4.50 15.0
October-December 4.50 30.0 3.00 10.0
January-March 4.50 45.0 3.00 20.0
April-June 3.00 55.0 3.00 30.0
Subtotal 16.50 55.0 9.00 30.0
FY82
July-September 3.00 65.0 3.00 40.0
October-December 3.00 75.0 3.00 50.0
January-March 4.50 90.0 3.75 62.5
April-June 3.00 100.0 3.75 75.0
Subtotal 13.50 100.0 13.50 75.0
FY83
July-September - - 3.75 87.5
October-December 3.75 100.0
Subtotal - - 7.50 100.0
Total 30.00 100.0 30.00 100.0
/a Assuming that the loan would become effective in June 1980.
/b Percentages are cumulative.
AEP Projects Department
February 29, 1980
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